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Organizational Form, Misappropriation
Risk, and the Substantive Consolidation
of Corporate Groups
by
CHRISTOPHER W. FROST*
Introduction
The financial collapse of a corporation raises significant questions
regarding its shareholders and creditors' ex ante allocation of the risk
that such a collapse might occur. In bankruptcy, most of these risk allo-
cation issues relate to the priority of particular creditors' claims against
the assets of the failed business. But determining priority first requires
some reasoned means of identifying the assets against which creditors
may assert their claims. In many cases, this question is simply one of
locating and distributing assets. However, when bankrupt firms have
conducted their operations through a complex web of subsidiary corpo-
rations, each holding distinct assets and having separate liabilities, the
question becomes much more complex.
As a general rule, bankruptcy law respects the separations between
commonly owned corporations.1 Regardless of the ownership structure
of corporate entities, assets and liabilities of related corporations are
treated as distinct for the purpose of a reorganization or liquidation. In a
growing number of cases, however, bankruptcy courts have invoked the
doctrine of substantive consolidation to disregard the separations that
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law; B.A. 1983, Uni-
versity of Kentucky; J.D. 1986, University of Kentucky College of Law. I thank Barry
Cushman, Thomas Greaney, Daniel Keating, Nancy Kaufman, Frank Kennedy, William
Lash, Katherine Pratt, and Douglas Williams for their valuable comments on an earlier draft
of this paper. I also thank Alexander Giftos and Stanley Rice for their able research
assistance.
I. Union Say. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie Restivo Baking Co.), 860
F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988).
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commonly owned corporate entities would have enjoyed under non-
bankruptcy law.
Substantive consolidation is the combination of the assets and liabil-
ities of two related bankruptcy estates into one entity for purposes of
distribution in a liquidation or under a plan of reorganization. 2 The re-
sult of a consolidation order 3 is similar to a merger under state law.
Creditors of the separately incorporated entities become creditors of the
consolidated group, sharing in the combined assets with all of the group's
creditors.4 Joint claims against two or more pre-consolidation entities
become one claim against the consolidated entity.5 Substantive consoli-
dation also eliminates intercompany obligations, 6 and renders moot
fraudulent transfer claims between the consolidated entities.7
Because the effect of consolidation is a pooling of assets and liabili-
ties, creditors may find that consolidation radically alters the ultimate
distribution of assets or ownership interests in the reorganized entity.8 In
2. See generally 5 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1100.06[1]
(15th ed. 1991); J. Stephen Gilbert, Note, Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer,
43 VAND. L. REV. 207, 209-21 (1990) (discussing the evolution of substantive consolidation,
its requirements and consequences).
3. This Article uses the term "consolidation" to refer to substantive consolidation as
opposed to joint administration or "procedural consolidation." The latter terms describe cases
in which multiple bankruptcies are consolidated only for procedural convenience. Distribu-
tional questions in these cases are determined on an entity-by-entity basis. In re Parkway
Calabasas Ltd., 89 B.R. 832, 836 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988), affid, 949 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1991);
5 KING ET. AL., supra note 2, at § 1100.07. While procedural consolidation is not meant to
interfere with the asset ownership and liability among related corporations, it may have very
real practical effects on distributional outcomes. See In re Manville Forest Prods., Corp., 896
F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing the difficulties created by procedural
consolidation).
4. See, e.g., Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking
Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Parkway Calabasas, 89 B.R. at 836-37; Chauncey
H. Levy, Joint Administration and Consolidation, 85 CoM. L.J. 538, 538-39 (1980).
5. In re Parkway Calabasas, 89 B.R. at 836-37.
6. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel (In re Seatrade Corp.), 369 F.2d 845, 847
(2d Cir. 1966).
7. In re Parkway Calabasas, 89 B.R. at 839.
8. In Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Co. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), the court observed that "because every entity is likely to have a different debt-to-
asset ratio, consolidation almost invariably redistributes wealth among the creditors of the
various entities." See also In re Snider Bros., 18 B.R. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (noting
the virtual certainty of disparate ratios of assets to liabilities).
For example, assume that a parent holding corporation (Holding) has two subsidiaries.
One of the subsidiaries (Manufacturing Co.) has assets of $5,000,000 and unsecured obliga-
tions of $10,000,000. The other (Sales Co.) has assets of $10,000,000 and unsecured obliga-
tions of $35,000,000. If the estates are treated separately, the creditors of Manufacturing Co.
will receive a distribution equal to 50% of their claims while the creditors of Sales Co. will
receive a distribution equal to 29% of their claims. If consolidated, all the creditors will re-
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fact, unless the consolidated group is solvent, 9 some creditor group will
necessarily find that consolidation results in a lower distribution than
would otherwise be the case. If the corporate group remains solvent after
consolidation, none of the creditors will be harmed. In this case, how-
ever, consolidation may result in a lower distribution to the shareholders
and a higher distribution to the creditors of the group.10
Unless the asset to liability ratio of each member of the corporate
group is equal, substantive consolidation will necessarily reduce the
bankruptcy distribution to some group of creditors or equity owners.
Given the general presumption of limited liability,11 consolidation nor-
mally defeats contractual expectations by rewriting the contracts gov-
erning the allocation of business risk among participants in the
enterprise. 12
Because substantive consolidation abrogates the general corporate
rule of limited liability, it may dramatically affect the way corporate
creditors and shareholders think about the allocation of business risk. In
particular, creditors and shareholders negotiate the terms of loans and
capital contributions against a backdrop of legal rules that provide a
baseline risk allocation. Limited liability forms a fundamental part of
this backdrop by isolating the assets of business entities for the purpose
of capital formation. Because substantive consolidation subjects the as-
sets of the business to all of the obligations of the consolidated entities,
the creditors and shareholders' contractual expectations regarding this
isolation will be unfulfilled.
ceive a distribution equal to 33% of their claims. Thus, consolidation may often substantially
effect the allocation of funds to various creditor groups in a reorganization or liquidation.
9. A corporation is "solvent" when the value of its assets exceeds the amount of its
liabilities and is "insolvent" when its liabilities exceed the value of its assets. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(31) (1988).
10. See, eg., In re Murray Indus., 119 B.R. 820, 830 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). Extending
the example from note 8 supra, assume that Manufacturing Co. has assets of $10,000,000 and
total liabilities of $5,000,000 and Sales Corp. has assets of $5,000,000 and total liabilities of
$ 10,000,000. If limited liability between the subsidiary corporations is respected, Sales' credi-
tors will receive a distribution equal to 50% of their claims and Holding will receive no distri-
bution. In contrast, the creditors of Manufacturing Co. will be paid in full and, after that
payment, Holding will receive a distribution equal to the remaining $5,000,000. If the two
companies are consolidated, both the assets and the liabilities of the consolidated entity will
total $15,000,000. Thus, the creditors of both Manufacturing and Sales will receive distribu-
tions equal to the full amount of their claims and Holding will receive nothing. This result will
be obtained unless all of the members of the corporate group are solvent.
11. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 409 (West 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 162 (1991); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 628 (McKinney 1992); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 6.22 (1987).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 84-103.
Of course, any consistently administered system could alleviate the
problem of unmet contractual expectations. In fact, many of the
problems resulting from consolidation may result more from its unpre-
dictable application than from the particular limited liability rule
adopted in bankruptcy. If the baseline rule in bankruptcy were consoli-
dation, creditors and shareholders would have no claim that the doctrine
interfered with their contractual expectations. Their expectations would
have been developed against this baseline.
The choice of rule, however, is not entirely irrelevant. The substan-
tive consolidation of corporate groups will result in the elimination of
creditor and shareholder reliance on limited liability between constituent
corporations which, in turn, will alter the structure of business organiza-
tion and finance. Whether such an alteration would create a more desira-
ble regime must be closely analyzed with reference to its effect on the
total costs of both aggregating capital and operating the business.
Bankruptcy highlights the conflicting interests and controversies
that arise in corporate and commercial law. Because the bankruptcy sys-
tem is fast becoming a significant means of resolving such disputes in
these areas,1 3 the substantive results in bankruptcy necessarily shape
creditors and shareholders' views of the contracts into which they have
entered. Substantive consolidation is no exception. A bankruptcy rule
that limits liability within corporate groups will necessarily have an im-
pact on the aggregation of capital and organization of business
operations.
Of course, limited liability is a concern in cases outside of bank-
ruptcy. In non-bankruptcy cases, parties often seek to "pierce the corpo-
rate veil." Thus, the analysis presented in this Article is applicable
outside of bankruptcy. This Article focuses on the bankruptcy rule of
substantive consolidation not only because bankruptcy cases are increas-
ingly important in resolving conflicts among corporate creditors and
shareholders, but also because some bankruptcy courts seem to order
consolidation on an unprincipled and unpredictable basis.
This Article examines the effect of substantive consolidation on vol-
untary creditors rather than tort and other involuntary claimants. 14
Commentators have taken a renewed interest in the question of tort pri-
13. In 1991, business bankruptcy filings increased 17% to reach a record high of over
73,500. Bankruptcy Statistics, BANKRUPTCY LAW DAILY (BNA) (January 15, 1992). The
overall number of bankruptcy filings has increased for seven consecutive years. Bankruptcy
Statistics, BANKRUPTCY LAW DAILY (BNA) (March 11, 1992).
14. Taxing entities, like tort claimants, may be characterized as involuntary claimants.
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bank-
ruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 529 (1976) [hereinafter Landers, Another Word].
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ority, x5 and have established a convincing case for eliminating limited
liability within corporate groups for the benefit of tort claimants. 16 Lim-
iting liability within corporate groups externalizes the risk to tort claim-
ants because unlike voluntary creditors, tort claimants are unable to
bargain for protection against, or compensation for, the increased risk
limited liability imposes. Because voluntary creditors theoretically can
bargain for protection against any increase in risk caused by limited lia-
bility, these creditors may have less of a need for the protection substan-
tive consolidation provides.' 7
Thus, the impact of substantive consolidation on voluntary and in-
voluntary credit relationships may be analyzed separately. Notwith-
standing notable exceptions,1 8 most bankruptcy cases do not involve
large numbers of tort claims. Further, the consolidation rule adopted
with respect to tort claimants need not affect the rule applied to volun-
tary claimants.' 9
Thus limited, this Article looks to the economic principles underly-
ing separate incorporation and limited liability in order to determine
whether corporate groups should be consolidated in bankruptcy. Part I
15. See, eg., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Li-
ability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability,
Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strate-
gic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REv. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Roe, Corporate Strategic
Reaction].
16. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1894-95; Leebron, supra note 15, at 1612-
26. Professor Robert Thompson's empirical study notes, however, that courts may be less
likely to pierce the corporate veil for the benefit of tort claimants. Robert B. Thompson, Pierc-
ing the Corporate Veil An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1058-59 (1991).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 170-175 for a discussion of contractual controls on
risk.
18. These include the bankruptcies of the Johns-Manville Corporation and the A.H.
Robins Corporation. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 Bankr. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(involving substantial claims by individuals injured by asbestos), affid in part and rev'd in part,
78 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re A.H. Robins Corp., 788 F.2d 994 (involving claims
by women injured by I.U.D.'s), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986). These "mass tort" cases are
well analyzed in Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction, supra note 15, and Mark J. Roe, Bank-
ruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM L. REv. 846 (1984).
19. For example, claims of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) for un-
derfunding of pension plans extend to all members of the employer's "controlled group." 26
U.S.C. § 4971(e)(2)(A) (1988). Thus, the PBGC enjoys a claim against the entire corporate
group without regard to corporate formalities. See generally PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 630 F.2d
4 (1st Cir. 1980) (all members of the controlled group held jointly and severally liable for
pension plan underfunding subject to a 30% net amount limitation), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914
(1981).
While the size of pension liabilities has created difficulties in a few bankruptcy cases, see
In re Chateaugay Corp., 130 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing the difficulties cre-
ated by large underfunding liability), the joint and several nature of the liability has not been
seriously challenged.
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discusses the courts' application of substantive consolidation. This Part
concludes that the courts' conceptions of creditor expectations render the
doctrine extremely uncertain and unprincipled.
Part II examines the rationale for limited liability. This Part in-
troduces a transaction cost analysis premised on the ability of parties to
allocate the risks of corporate failure through contract. This analytical
model focuses on the effect of the default rule governing risk allocation
on the costs of the contracting process. Part II argues that corporate law
rules governing risk allocation should comport with most investors' and
lenders' preferences. This approach would reduce transaction costs by
minimizing the parties' need to contract around the corporate law rules.
Part III examines the organization of the production of goods and
services in firms and across markets. It also discusses the importance of
limited liability to various organizational structures. This analysis con-
cludes that limited liability is fundamental to the efficiencies generated by
horizontally related and conglomerate firms, but is less necessary to ver-
tically integrated firms. Thus, those who invest in and lend to entities
that operate as a component of a larger, vertically related production
process are less likely to be satisfied with the baseline rule of limited
liability.
Parts IV and V consider the impact of limited liability on particular
risks faced by creditors. Part IV offers a model of risk analysis that di-
vides risk into two components-enterprise risk and misappropriation
risk. Misappropriation risk is defined as the risk that shareholders will
force management to take actions that increase the risk of firm failure.
This type of risk is distinguished from enterprise risk-the irreducible
variability 20 in the earnings of the business. Limited liability increases
misappropriation risk by increasing opportunities for asset shifting after
the rate of interest on debt is fixed. Parts IV and V also examine the
existing controls on misappropriation risk. These Parts conclude that
the misappropriation risk created by limited liability in vertically inte-
grated corporate groups is not adequately restricted by existing
constraints.
Finally, Part VI provides a model for substantive consolidation that
looks primarily to the level of vertical integration between the entities
sought to be consolidated. The Article proposes that courts should typi-
cally consolidate entities that constitute components of vertically inte-
grated operations. Firms comprising parts of other types of organizations
should be consolidated only in rare circumstances.
20. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
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I. Substantive Consolidation and the Effect of Creditor
Expectations
One of the most fundamental principles underlying the Bankruptcy
Code is its rule governing priority of distribution. Under Chapter 7 of
the Code,2 1 proceeds of asset liquidations are generally paid in accord-
ance with state law priorities.22 Reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the
Code are governed by a default rule of absolute priority. The absolute
priority rule provides that if a class of claims or interests does not accept
a plan of reorganization, 23 confirmation of the plan can occur only if that
class has been paid in full or if no junior class of claims or interests re-
ceives any property under the plan.2 4 These provisions combine to make
non-bankruptcy law priorities an important part of the bankruptcy
system.
Priority is only half of the picture. To fully understand the bank-
ruptcy distributional scheme, the scope of assets to which creditor claims
extend must be considered. When a multi-tiered corporate structure col-
lapses, the scope of assets subject to particular claims can be difficult to
determine. The records of the corporation may be insufficiently clear to
distinguish between the assets and liabilities of each corporation. Even
when the accounting records of the business are adequate to make these
distinctions, creditors may claim either that they were unaware of the
corporate separations between business operations, or that economically,
the business is a single, unitary enterprise. In the face of these problems,
substantive consolidation can be an attractive alternative.25
21. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988). Exceptions to this principle include priorities of taxing agen-
cies and a limited priority of wage claimants. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
23. In order to accept a plan of reorganization, claimants holding at least two-thirds in
amount and more than one-half in number of claims must assent. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988).
Acceptance by a class of equity interest requires only the assent of interest holders of at least
two-thirds in amount of the total interests in the class. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (1988).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988). For a more detailed analysis of the absolute priority rule,
see Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the
Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 738 (1988).
25. The Bankruptcy Code does not specifically provide for substantive consolidation.
Therefore, bankruptcy courts must rely on their general equity powers under section 105 of the
Code. See Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.),
860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988); Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Co. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810
F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1000
(2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); In re Murray Indus., 119 B.R. 820, 828
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). Section 105 of the Code authorizes bankruptcy courts to "issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the
Code]." This broad grant of authority has been severely limited by Supreme Court pronounce-
ments that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In many of the reported cases in which consolidation has been or-
dered, the assets of the corporate group cannot be segregated and identi-
fied with any particular entity within that group. 26 Substantive
consolidation in these cases may be attributed to the need for resolution
in a situation in which the protection of contractual expectations is im-
practicable. When the cost of allocating the assets of a corporate group
into the constituent corporations is so high that it will consume the es-
tate, pragmatism requires that the assets and liabilities of the group be
pooled. A second category of cases involves corporate management's af-
firmative misrepresentation of either the corporate structure or the asset
ownership of the company. 27 These misrepresentation cases seem rela-
tively uncontroversial as well.2 8 In an increasing number of cases, how-
ever, courts have held that neither entanglement nor affirmative
misrepresentation is necessary to warrant an order of substantive consoli-
dation.29 These cases seek to balance the prejudice that may result from
a failure to consolidate against the harm that consolidation may visit on
particular creditors 30-- readily admitting a liberal trend toward consoli-
dating corporate groups.31
exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
26. See, e.g., In re Moran Pipe & Supply Corp., 130 B.R. 588, 591-93 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.
1991); In re Murray Indus., 119 B.R. at 827; In re Baker & Getty Fin. Serv., 78 B.R. 139, 141-
42 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Luth, 28 B.R. 564, 567 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); In re
Lewellyn, 26 B.R. 246, 251 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1982); In re Food Fair, Inc., 10 B.R. 123, 127
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re D.H. Overmyer Co., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 412, 415 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1976).
27. See Stone v. Eacho (In re Tip Top Tailors, Inc.), 127 F.2d 284, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1942)
(parent paid operating expenses of subsidiary store, with exception of payroll and bills less
than $10); In re Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. 390, 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990) (business stationery,
brochures, press releases, and interviews indicated that 800-store chain operated as a single
economic unit); In re I.R.C.C., Inc., 105 B.R. 237, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (debtor entities
used a common name on invoices).
28. See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 499, 520-21 (1976) [hereinafter Posner, Affiliated Corporations] ("Misrepresentation is
a way of increasing a creditor's information costs, and the added costs are wasted from a social
standpoint to the extent that the misrepresentation could be prevented at lower cost by an
appropriate sanction against it.").
29. See In re Orfa Corp., 129 B.R. 404, 415 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Monark Egg
Corp., No. 87-0347-CV-W-1, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9997, at *7 n.7 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 29,
1987); In re F.A. Potts & Co., 23 B.R. 569, 573 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Manzey
Land & Cattle Co., 17 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982); In re Richton Int'l Corp., 12 B.R.
555, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
30. See, e.g., In re F.A. Potts & Co., 23 B.R. at 573 n.3; In re Richton Int'l, 12 B.R. at
558.
31. Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Ass'n, 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11 th Cir. 1991); In
re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 765 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re
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On the one hand, it may be argued that a bankruptcy court, acting
as a court of equity, should have the ability to recognize that some multi-
tiered corporate groups are single enterprises. On the other hand, con-
solidation clearly will result in harm to some creditor or shareholder
group. These conflicting propositions have led to statements such as:
"[T]he fact that... creditors may be adversely affected by... substan-
tive consolidation [is] not controlling and the bankruptcy court must
weigh the conflicting interests which should be balanced in such way as
to reach a rough approximation to some rather than to deny justice to
all. ''32 At best, "rough approximation" supplies a very loose guideline
for the courts.33 If some equalization of return among the creditors of
the constituent corporations is desired, one must remain mindful of
Judge Friendly's admonition that "[e]quality among creditors who have
lawfully bargained for different treatment is not equity but its
opposite."'34
At bottom, courts considering substantive consolidation seem pri-
marily concerned with a search for contractual expectations. In many
cases, consolidation is based on the creditors' past dealings with the sepa-
rate entities as one business.35 In these cases, courts utilize consolidation
ostensibly to fulfill the contractual expectations of the creditors.36 Reli-
ance concerns cut both ways, however. Creditors may have entered into
credit arrangements with an expectation that the borrower would not be
liable for the debts of affiliated entities. Therefore, while consolidation
may be necessary to protect the expectations of some creditors, it may
destroy the expectations of others.37
Murray Indus., 119 B.R. 820, 828 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re F.A. Potts & Co., 23 B.R. at
571; In re Vecco Constr. Indus., 4 B.R. 407, 409 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
32. In re Murray Indus., 119 B.R. at 832 (citing In re Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co., 14
Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
33. There are, of course, some cases in which a "rough approximation" may be the best
any creditor or shareholder could hope for. This situation occurs when the books and records
of the corporate group are so hopelessly obscured that any attempt to segregate the assets of
the group would be hopeless. See supra text accompanying note 26.
34. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel (In re Seatrade Corp.), 369 F.2d 845, 848
(2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., concurring).
35. See, e.g., Eastgroup Properties, 935 F.2d at 250; Soviero v. Franklin Natl Bank, 328
F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir. 1964); see also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS: BANKRUPTCY LAW 420 (1985) ("Where a creditor reasonably thought that it was
dealing with the enterprise as a group rather than with one of the affiliated corporations con-
ducting the business, complete substantive consolidation, making available all assets of the
enterprise for satisfaction of the claim, is obviously proper.").
36. See cases cited supra notes 30-32.
37. See Eastgroup Properties, 935 F.2d at 249; Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Co. (In re
Auto-Train), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Snider Bros., 18 B.R. 230, 238 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1982); In re Commercial Envelope, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) at 197-98.
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This aspect of consolidation has led to judicial statements such as:
"The power to consolidate should be used sparingly because of the possi-
bility of unfair treatment of creditors of a corporate debtor who have
dealt solely with that debtor without knowledge of its interrelationship
with others."'38 While many courts warn of the dangers of interference
with contractual expectations, 39 their levels of adherence to this principle
differ radically.
In In re Flora Mir Candy Corp. ,40 a classic case involving creditors'
reliance on the separation of the entities, the Second Circuit affirmed a
district court order refusing to consolidate Flora Mir with its affiliate,
Meadors. 4' The consolidation request was opposed by a group of Mead-
ors' creditors who held bonds that were issued while Meadors was still an
independent corporation.42 Because the claims of the Meadors creditors
arose before Meadors was acquired by Flora Mir, the creditors had
clearly relied on the separateness of the entities. 43
In Flora Mir, Judge Friendly stated that the district court "decision
was so manifestly correct that we should hardly have written an opinion
were it not to make it plain that referees should not order consolidation
on so flimsy a basis as was done here." 44 The Flora Mir court empha-
sized creditor reliance on separateness: "[T]he inequity of consolidation
could scarcely be clearer than in this case. The debentures had been is-
sued when Meadors was an independent company, more than six years
before its acquisition by Flora Mir. ' '45
Courts have also sought to protect the reliance interest of lenders
that have extended credit while the borrower was part of the corporate
group sought to be consolidated. In In re Crown Machine & Welding,
Inc. ,46 the court refused consolidation, noting the disparity between the
asset and liability ratios of the two entities.47 Unlike the situation in
38. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847.
39. See, e.g., Union Say. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking
Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 455 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1990); In re Murray Indus., 119 B.R. 820, 829 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Richton,
12 B.R. 555, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
40. 432 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1970).
41. Id. at 1062-63.
42. Meadors' creditors were to become general creditors of the Flora Mir group, rather
than subordinated creditors of Meadors only. Id. at 1063.
43. Id. at 1062-63.
44. Id. at 1062.
45. Id.
46. 100 B.R. 25 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989).
47. Id. at 28.
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Flora Mir, however, the objecting creditors were not shown to have ex-
tended credit prior to the combination of the group.4 8
Not all courts seem to be as concerned with creditor reliance. In
Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Association,49 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed an order consolidating two debtors that owned and oper-
ated motels. One of the companies was a limited partnership that
acquired and held an interest in motel properties. 50 The other debtor
was a corporation that operated the properties. 51 Creditors of the limited
partnership appealed the order consolidating the entities. The court ac-
knowledged that the objecting creditors would be harmed by the consoli-
dation, but found that the creditors had not shown that they relied solely
on the credit of the limited partnership. 52 The fact that the entities held
themselves out as separate was insufficient to show reliance. 53
Although courts often defer to creditor reliance interests, they do
not generally defer to shareholder reliance interests. For instance, in In
re Murray Industries,5 4 an equity security holder objected to the consoli-
dation of a group of sixteen affiliated corporations.55 The court deter-
mined that, regardless of shareholder reliance on limited liability, claims
by equity security holders are subordinate to all creditor claims against
the group.5 6 Thus, when courts take reliance issues into consideration, it
is for the benefit of creditors rather than shareholders. 57
The courts' varying approaches to the problem of contractual expec-
tations illustrates a fundamental misperception of the way in which such
expectations are developed. In large part, expectations are a function of
the underlying legal regime. 58 By attempting to determine contractual
48. The unsecured creditors' committee of Crown Welding raised objections to consoli-
dation, presumably on behalf of the majority of unsecured creditors. Id. at 26. There was no
indication in the opinion that the entities sought to be consolidated had recently become
affiliated.
49. 935 F.2d 245 (1lth Cir. 1991).
50. Id. at 246.
51. Id. at 246-47.
52. Id. at 251.
53. Id.
54. 119 B.R. 820, 832 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
55. Id. at 827.
56. "Thus, in the last analysis, the equity clearly favors the entire creditors' constituency
over the interest of the equity security interest holders." Id. at 832.
57. This situation must be distinguished from cases in which parent company manage-
ment plays a role in the downfall of a subsidiary. The reliance by these management creditors
is disregarded because of their participation in the subsidiary's demise, not because they are
shareholders. See In re I.R.C.C., 105 B.R. 237, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
58. Of course, some courts recognize this fact and are much more cautious in their ap-
proach to creditor reliance questions. In In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., the court stated:
[C]reditors who make loans on the basis of the financial status of a separate entity
expectations on an ad hoc basis, courts have developed a series of deci-
sions that cannot be systematized into a coherent legal regime. Thus, the
application of substantive consolidation presents an indeterminate risk to
the "expectations" parties have when entering into contracts, because it
is becoming increasingly difficult to determine the doctrine's
applicability.
When deciding whether to apply substantive consolidation, some
courts make extensive use of factor and balancing tests.59 Several courts,
however, have recognized that the inquiry is not subject to analysis in
such terms. 60 These courts justify consolidation by showing that the
prejudice to the parties seeking consolidation outweighs the prejudice to
any particular creditor group. 61 Alternatively, some courts seek an ap-
expect to be able to look to the assets of their particular borrower for satisfaction of
that loan. Such lenders... do not anticipate either having the assets of a more sound
company available in the case of insolvency or having the creditors of a less sound
debtor compete for the borrower's assets. Such expectations create significant equi-
ties. Moreover, lenders' expectations are central to the calculation of interest rates
and other terms of loans, and fulfilling those expectations is therefore important to
the efficiency of credit markets. Such efficiency will be undermined by imposing sub-
stantive consolidation in circumstances in which creditors believed they were dealing
with separate entities.
Union Say. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d
515, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1988).
59. The most widely used "factor" test was developed by the court in In re Vecco Constr.
Indus., 4 B.R. 407 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). These factors are: (1) the presence or absence of
consolidated balance sheets; (2) the unity of interests and ownership between the various enti-
ties; (3) the existence of parent and intercorporate guaranties on loans; (4) the degree of diffi-
culty in segregating and ascertaining individual assets and liabilities; (5) the transfers of assets
without formal observance of corporate formalities; (6) the commingling of assets and business
functions; (7) the profitability of consolidation at a single physical location. Id. at 410.
60. See, e.g., In re Steury, 94 B.R. 553, 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); In re Tureaud, 59
B.R. 973, 977 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986); In re Luth, 28 B.R. 564, 566-67 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1983); In re Snider Bros., 18 B.R. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
61. In In re Snider Bros., the court discussed the development of the Vecco factors and
determined that the "only real criterion" in considering consolidation should be "the economic
prejudice of continued debtor separateness versus the economic prejudice of consolidation."
18 B.R. at 234.
The court concluded that this criterion must be met prior to granting consolidation. The
applicant must show that there is either a necessity for consolidation or a harm to be avoided
by use of the equitable remedy of consolidation, and that the benefits of consolidation outweigh
the harm to be caused to the objector. Id. at 238. Various courts have adopted this analysis as
determinative. See Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Co. (In re Auto-Train), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Holywell Corp. v. Bank of New York, 59 B.R. 340, 348 (S.D. Fla. 1986); In re
Tureaud, 45 B.R. 658, 663 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985), aftd, 59 B.R. 973 (N.D. Okla. 1986); In
re DRW Property Co., 54 B.R. 489, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); In re F.A. Potts & Co., 23
B.R. 569, 572 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Manzey Land & Cattle Co., 17 B.R. 332, 338
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1982).
A few courts have further refined the test by including two additional factors: the "sub-
stantial identity" among the debtors and the creditors' reliance on the credit of a particular
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proach that will "yield an equitable treatment of creditors without any
undue prejudice to any particular group."'62
Courts appear to analyze substantive consolidation under a variety
of tests and with an eye toward protecting various reliance interests. Yet
these approaches are little more than legitimating devices for an ad hoc
application of a doctrine that significantly affects corporate risk alloca-
tion. Beyond the few general observations made above, a doctrinal anal-
ysis of substantive consolidation can only provide an illustration of how
difficult it is to predict instances in which it will be applicable.6 3 Barring
the cases involving misrepresentation and hopelessly intermingled assets,
the only guide to predicting case outcomes is a general impression that
courts harbor some vague concerns about protecting creditor
expectations.
II. A Transaction Cost Analysis of Limited Liability
The primary difficulty with the substantive consolidation doctrine is
that its application is uncertain and unprincipled. As a result, limited
liability, a fundamental baseline rule regarding the allocation of risk of
business failure, is also rendered uncertain. Because this baseline is inde-
terminate, transaction costs are increased as capital contributors attempt
to understand and protect themselves against the uncertainty. An obvi-
ous solution to the problem of indeterminacy is to provide clarity by al-
ways, or never, consolidating corporate groups. While this solution is
superficially appealing, it ignores the complex relationships among cor-
porate capital contributors. Fixed rules applicable to all situations will
not provide the answer, because they will nearly always be under- or
over-inclusive. Instead, the solution may lie in creating a limited number
of legal rules tailored to broad categories of cases presenting consistent
types of problems.
This Part looks at limited liability with reference to the transaction
costs such a rule can be expected to generate. This model assumes that
contracting parties are able to adjust their contractual expectations re-
gardless of the rule followed by corporate law. For example, if corporate
groups are normally consolidated in bankruptcy, creditors and share-
holders will not rely on corporate separateness in making their financing
subsidiary. See, e.g., Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Ass'n, 935 F.2d 245, 251 (11th
Cir. 1991); In re Baker & Getty Fin. Serv., 78 B.R. 139, 142 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
62. In re Manzey Land & Cattle, 17 B.R. at 338 (quoting In re Richton Intl. Corp., 12
B.R. 565, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
63. "[S]ubstantive consolidation cases are to a great degree sui generis." 5 KING ET AL.,
supra note 2, at § 1100.06[1].
decisions, especially given the ease with which a corporation may elect
bankruptcy. 64 The benefits of separately incorporating components of a
corporate group will not include insulation of business assets from liabili-
ties incurred by other business operations. 65
A. The Case for Limited Liability
Limited liability is perhaps the most well-recognized and important
attribute of the corporation.66 Early analyses of the corporation justified
limited liability as a logical extension of the view that corporations exist
as entities separate from their investors. 67 More recent models of the
corporation see the rule as necessary to achieve the benefits of diversifica-
tion and the aggregation of capital at low cost.68  While most of the
scholarly analyses of limited liability have focused on its impact on capi-
tal market efficiency and diversification, an increasing body of scholar-
64. Bankruptcy relief is widely available without regard to the financial condition of the
business. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
65. This will not necessarily mean the end of the corporate form of organization. Other
benefits of incorporating include the shareholders' easy exchange of ownership rights, the cor-
poration's perpetual life, and the separation of management from ownership. See Roger E.
Meiners et al., Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 364 (1979); see
also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 10-24 (1986) (discussing benefits of corporate
organization).
66. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,'THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 40 (1991) ("Limited liability is a distinguishing feature of corporate
law-perhaps the distinguishing feature."). But see Meiners et al., supra note 65, at 352 (ques-
tioning whether the baseline rule of limited liability has any significant impact on risk
allocation).
67. This notion is reflected in the following excerpt:
Classically, a corporation was conceived as an artificial person, coming into existence
through creation by a sovereign power.
Thence proceeded certain advantages, which led the corporate form to become
the principal method of organization of commercial, and especially of industrial, ac-
tivity. Its primary business advantage, of course, was insulation of individual stock-
holders composing the corporation from liability for the debts of the corporate
enterprise.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 343 (1947). But
see William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 194 (1929) ("Little will be gained by seeking to ascertain what
a corporation is. It is not a thing. It is a method. It defies definition when removed from the
background of the purpose attempted to be accomplished and the manner of accomplishing
it.").
68. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 40-62; Paul Halpern et al., An
Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980);
Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259
(1967); Meiners et al., supra note 65, at 357-64.
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ship has examined the need for limited liability within the corporate
group.69
Perhaps the most compelling justification for limited liability is its
beneficial effect on the processes by which capital is aggregated in the
market. A rule of unlimited liability would reduce the benefits of diversi-
fication, 70 because investing in a number of firms would entail a higher
risk of losing all or a substantial portion of an individual's wealth. 71
Limited liability also allows capital markets to work efficiently in
setting a price for the securities of a particular company.72 Capital mar-
kets work efficiently when they set a uniform price for securities that
impounds all relevant information about the value of firms. 73 A rule of
unlimited liability would result in a securities pricing system that would
take into account not only the discounted cash flows of the business but
also the wealth of the owners of the stock. Thus, a potential investor
would need to expend more resources analyzing the prospects of a firm
under consideration. 74
Limited liability can also be justified through agency cost analysis.
Easterbrook and Fischel see limited liability as necessary to facilitate the
separation of management and risk bearing.75 Without a limitation on
shareholder liability, each shareholder would place her entire wealth at
69. See, eg., BLUMBERG, supra note 35, at 399-452; Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified
Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589,
617-28 (1975) [hereinafter Landers, Unified Approach]; Leebron, supra note 15, at 1612-26;
Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28, at 516-26.
70. Portfolio theory provides that investors may reduce their potential loss by investing
in many different companies. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1986); Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1980); Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 327, 329 (1983)
("Common Stock allows residual risk to be spread across many residual claimants who indi-
vidually choose the extent to which they bear risk and who can diversify across organizations
offering such claims.").
71. Manne, supra note 68, at 262; see also EASTERBROOK & FisCHEL, supra note 66, at 43
(noting efficient diversification under limited liability).
72. Manne, supra note 68, at 262-65; see also Halpern et al., supra note 68, at 129-31
(assessing unlimited liability in imperfect capital markets).
73. See Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in THE NEW PALGRAVE FI-
NANCE 127-34 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989).
74. A few commentators have suggested that these market price distortions would be
eliminated if liability were imposed on shareholders pro-rata on the basis of their percentage
ownership of the firm's shares. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1903-04; Leeb-
ron, supra note 15, at 1608-10. Leebron asserts that under such a rule significant distortions in
market prices would be unlikely because individuals without wealth do not buy shares. Leeb-
ron, supra note 15, at 1609. Under his pro rata rule he dismisses the effect of individual share-
holder wealth on the value of shares as "highly unlikely in practice." Id.
75. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 41.
risk by investing in the corporation. 76 This high level of risk would in-
duce monitoring beyond that which is strictly necessary to prevent mana-
gerial shirking.77
Unlimited liability would also increase agency costs by causing
shareholders to monitor the wealth of one another,78 because their total
exposure would be dependent on the financial position of the other share-
holders as well as the corporation. Limited liability eliminates this moni-
toring because it makes the financial position of other shareholders
irrelevant. 79
Although market efficiency and agency cost analyses provide com-
pelling justifications for the limitation of liability in publicly held firms,80
these concepts are insufficient to explain the limitation of liability be-
tween members of corporate groups. Wholly owned subsidiary corpora-
tions do not access equity capital markets, and thus market efficiency is
not a concern.8 ' Because risk bearing and management are not special-
ized and separated in privately held corporations, agency costs are mini-
mized.8 2  The costs of shareholder monitoring are lower in private
corporations because of the small number of shareholders. These obser-
vations have led many commentators to draw a sharp distinction be-
tween public and private corporations.8 3
76. Id. at 40-41.
77. The problem with this analysis is that limited liability simply shifts some of the risk of
business failure from the shareholders to the creditors. Thus even when shareholders have less
of an incentive to monitor, creditors may have a higher incentive. If creditors are in a better
position to monitor managers, the parties will most likely bargain for a rule limiting share-
holder liability. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 44-49. Therefore, such a limita-
tion should be the off-the-rack rule provided by corporate statutes. Id.
78. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 42; Halpern et al., supra note 68, at 129-
31.
79. Easterbrook and Fischel also argue that "limited liability facilitates optimal invest-
ment decisions" by insuring that managers do not refuse to undertake projects that are "too
risky." EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 43-44.
80. Apparently the courts agree. In his empirical study of veil-piercing, Professor
Thompson found that courts do not pierce the veil to benefit creditors of public corporations.
Thompson, supra note 16, at 1054-56.
81. See Halpern et al., supra note 68, at 147-48. While debt market efficiency may be a
concern to members of corporate groups, few have seriously suggested that limited liability
should not protect corporate creditors. See Leebron, supra note 15, at 1636-49 (considering
and rejecting unlimited creditor liability to tort claimants, but proposing that tort claimants be
granted priority over creditor claimants).
82. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 56.
83. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 55-57; Halpern et al., supra note 68,
at 147-49; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1882-1909; Robert W. Hillman, Limited
Liability and Externalization of Risk: A Comment on the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 477, 485. Cf. Leebron, supra note 15 at 1626-36 (stating that the benefits of limited
liability in close corporations have been understated).
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B. Limited Liability in Corporate Groups: Risk Allocation and the
Relevance of the Baseline Rule
The justification for limited liability in privately held corporations,
including corporate groups, is that it allocates the risk of the business
venture in a way that creditors and shareholders usually prefer over any
other alternatives. Thus, limited liability forms the backdrop against
which creditors and shareholders develop contractual expectations re-
garding risk allocation.
All other things being equal, a baseline rule of limited liability allo-
cates more of the risk of business failure to the creditors as a group.
Limited liability provides a device for insulating shareholder assets from
the claims of creditors. While this insulation normally protects the
shareholders, the rule may also operate within corporate groups to allo-
cate risk among various creditors. Creditors develop their expectations
of risk, and concomitantly their desired return, by reference to the liabili-
ties as well as the assets of the borrowing entity. Thus, the ability to limit
the liability borne by a particular entity is an essential feature of corpo-
rate finance.
Perhaps the best approach to developing a justification for limited
liability within corporate groups is to examine how capital contributors
might adjust to an alternative rule. The risk allocation rule set by corpo-
rate or bankruptcy law may be largely irrelevant, 84 because the funda-
mental risk of the business is unchanged by the limited liability rule. For
fully informed capital contributors, expectations are a function of the
baseline rule. When that rule does not fit the transaction, they may bar-
gain around it.85 If courts reliably recognize limited liability, creditors
may conduct their credit analyses and negotiate interest rates with refer-
ence to the assets, liabilities, and business operations of the borrowing
entity alone. Conversely, if courts routinely disregard the separateness of
related entities, creditors and managers may approach credit analysis and
interest rate negotiation with reference to the entire corporate group.8 6
The importance of the baseline rule may be further restricted by
contracting parties' ability to opt out of the particular legal regime in
existence. Under existing law, certain situations result in creditors con-
tracting around the effects of limited liability. Institutional creditors
84. See Meiners et al., supra note 65, at 359 ("[Ihe economic consequences of a rule of
unlimited liability would probably have been little different from what we observe under the
existing arrangement.").
85. Id. at 360-61. See also, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 395
(4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
86. See Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28, at 505-07.
often take guarantees from non-borrowing entities within a corporate
group. 87 These guarantees are a selective means of contracting around
limited liability to reach the assets of the entire corporate group.
Under a baseline rule of unlimited liability, creditors and sharehold-
ers may also bargain to adopt a different risk allocation rule when they so
desire. Shareholders may insist that certain creditor groups agree to
limit the reach of their claims to particular assets. For example, general
partnerships may borrow on a non-recourse basis when the partners are
unwilling to subject all of their assets to the risk of the business venture. 88
Through secured credit, creditors can achieve the risk allocation re-
sults of limited liability in an unlimited liability regime. By ensuring pri-
ority through a security interest, lenders are less affected by the broader
scope of assets and liabilities that an unlimited liability rule entails. 89
Thus, in an unlimited liability regime, creditors may still order both their
relative priorities and the scope of assets to which their claims are
subject.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the particular rule is less impor-
tant than its predictability. 90 If contracting parties can ascertain the rule,
they can adjust their contracts to account for its effects. Creditors and
shareholders will either contract around the rule or adjust their de-
manded returns to account for the result of the applicable rule. Thus,
Judge Richard Posner has observed that the general corporate rule of
limited liability "should not be expected, in general, to have a profound
impact on the credit system or to alter the balance of advantage between
debtor and creditor." 91
C. Transaction Cost Analysis and the Landers-Posner Debate
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, the impact of the baseline
chosen is not entirely neutral. The absence of any substantive impact
87. See Meiners et al., supra note 65, at 360-61; Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra
note 28, at 505; Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 432 (1992) (addressing guarantees in partnerships).
88. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L.
REV. 80, 112-13 (1991) (modem cases support enforcement of non-recourse agreements).
89. This observation holds even in substantive consolidation cases. Courts recognize the
need to protect security interests when consolidating related entities. See In re Gulfco Inv.
Corp., 593 F.2d 921, 926-27 (10th Cir. 1979).
90. "Predictability" is, of course, a relative term. One cannot expect absolute predictabil-
ity from any system of law that must take complex and conflicting incentives into account.
However, re-categorizing cases to which differing rules apply may still increase the system's
predictability while at the same time resolving the difficulties created by conflicts among inter-
ested parties.
91. Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28, at 505.
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only changes the focus of the inquiry. Thus, rather than looking to the
substantive effect of the rule, the true question is whether the particular
rule reduces transaction costs.
The Coase Theorem suggests that in the absence of transaction costs
parties will bargain to the most desirable property allocation regardless
of the legal rule.92 Based on this view, the goal of the legal system should
be to produce rules that reduce transaction costs. Because bargaining
around a particular rule is costly, the rule should reflect the general
desires of the parties.93
This approach fueled a debate in the mid-1970s over whether lim-
ited liability should apply to multi-tiered corporations in bankruptcy. 94
In the first volley of the debate, then-Professor Jonathan Landers as-
serted that managers operate separately incorporated units with an eye
toward the overall profitability of the group and that creditors normally
lend with an expectation that repayment will be tied to the overall earn-
ings of the group.95 Landers was concerned that these factors shift the
risk of promoting business from residual claimants to creditors and the
public. 96 According to Landers, the bankruptcy system should recognize
the inherent "enterprise tendencies" 97 in corporate groups and consoli-
date related entities in bankruptcy. 98
92. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also
Meiners et al., supra note 65, at 359-60.
93. Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28, at 506 ("The criterion of an efficient
corporation law is therefore whether the terms do in fact reflect commercial realities, so that
transacting parties are generally content with them.").
94. See generally Landers, Unified Approach, supra note 69 (opposing limited liability of
affiliated corporations); Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28 (supporting limited lia-
bility); Landers, Another Word, supra note 14 (rebutting Posner). Although this initial ex-
change took place over 15 years ago, these three articles have set the terms for further debate
and the controversy remains unresolved. See BLUMBERG, supra note 35, at 448, 448-52 (siding
with Landers); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1919-20 (siding with Posner); Leeb-
ron, supra note 15, at 1614 (same); see also POSNER, EONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at
406-09 (revisiting the debate).
95. Landers, Unified Approach, supra note 69, at 641. Landers also provides another
reason to consolidate: "Whether any one company has a significant amount of assets to satisfy
claims is likely to be either fortuitous or the result of an attempt to favor certain creditors over
others." Id.
96. Id. at 593.
97. Landers was not the first to use the term "enterprise" to describe these tendencies. In
The Theory of the Enterprise Entity, Berle noted a category of cases in which "courts disre-
gard[ed] the corporate fiction specifically because it has parted company with the enterprise-
fact, for whose furtherance the corporation was created." Berle, supra note 67, at 348; see also
ELVIN R. LATry, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 212-20 (1936) (discussing
the single enterprise).
98. Landers recognized that some creditors rely on the separate nature of corporations
operating within a group, and he therefore created a limited exception to his principle when a
Judge (then-Professor) Richard Posner's response was characteristi-
cally well developed. What Landers failed to recognize, Posner asserted,
is that the efficiency of corporate law depends entirely on whether parties
find it necessary to change the terms of an off-the-rack contractual rule.99
Posner contended that the "primary utility of corporation law lies in pro-
viding a set of standard, implied contract terms... so that business firms
do not have to stipulate these terms anew every time they transact,
although they could do so if necessary."' 00 He argued that shifting the
risk from shareholder to creditor may be desirable because creditors may
be superior risk bearers, 10 1 and that the additional risk imposed on credi-
tors would be compensated through a higher interest rate.10 2 Posner
went on to explain that corporate groups did not present any particular
risk to corporate creditors because the management of the business could
be expected to operate the constituent corporations as "profit centers." 103
The Landers-Posner debate illustrates the difficulty of applying the
transaction cost analysis to the problem of limited liability in corporate
groups. Both sides appear to be correct at some level. The organiza-
tional structure of some corporate groups is closely tied to the ability to
shift risk freely among the various capital contributors. Market mecha-
nisms designed to shift risk among capital contributors should normally
produce the most efficient allocation of resources and organizational
structures. On the other hand, limiting liability under certain circum-
stances produces separate corporate entities that do not have any rela-
tionship to the economic operations of the group. The separateness of
these entities raises suspicions that they have been separated for some
sinister purpose-to externalize risk from shareholders onto creditors.
Mediating these competing ideas requires a close examination of the rea-
sons that members of a corporate group are separately incorporated and
the types of risk that various organizational forms can be expected to
impose on creditors.
creditor could demonstrate reliance on the creditworthiness of a particular member of the
group. Landers, Unified Approach, supra note 69, at 639-40. The problems with the courts'
approaches to creditor and shareholder reliance issues are illustrated supra text accompanying
notes 35-63.
99. Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28, at 505-07.
100. Id. at 506.
101. Posner asserts that creditors may be superior risk bearers because they are generally
less risk averse and are better able to assess the risk of business failure. Id. at 501-02; see also
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 394 (creditors are in a better position than
shareholders to appraise risk and receive the added protection of limited liability by virtue of
their corporate form).
102. Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28, at 501-02.
103. Id. at 513-14; see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 408.
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H1I. Organizational Form and Limited Liability
A baseline rule of limited liability makes more sense when one un-
derstands the reasons for corporate afflliation. Professor Phillip
Blumberg, who has commented extensively on the impact of economic
integration on decisions involving corporate groups, 1°4 asserts that
courts generally support the "enterprise" theory of liability.10 5 In es-
sence, Blumberg's view holds that courts should ignore separate corpo-
rate lines when the affiliated entities are but a single integrated
enterprise. 0 6 Blumberg appears to see "integration" as going beyond the
classical, vertically integrated firm and encompassing horizontal relation-
ships as well as the ownership unification of components of a single pro-
duction process. 107
This Part examines the impact of limited liability on various forms
of corporate organization by distinguishing three major categories of eco-
nomic organization. Initially, economic relationships may be separated
into two categories-integrated and conglomerate. 108 While conglomer-
ate relationships stand alone in an analysis of economic organization, the
term integration itself comprises two forms of corporate affiliation-ver-
tically integrated and horizontally related. The classical vertically inte-
grated firm owns components of a single production and distribution
process. Vertically integrated affiliates are characterized by large num-
bers of intercompany transfers of goods and services. 109 Horizontally re-
lated entities produce complementary or competing products. This type
104. See generally BLUMBERG, supra note 35, at 36.
105. Id. at 451 ("There can be no question that the enterprise view expressed by Professor
Landers is dramatically supported by the reported cases.").
106. See id. at 8-12; Landers, Another Word, supra note 14, at 539-40.
107. For example, Blumberg describes In re Gulfco Investment Corp., 593 F.2d 921 (10th
Cir. 1979), as a case involving an economically integrated group. See BLUMBERG, supra note
35, at 437. In In re Gulfco, however, the subsidiaries operated different realty developments
and thus may have been more appropriately characterized as horizontally related. In re
Gulfco, 593 F.2d at 929.
Landers appears to take a similar approach. See Landers, Unified Approach, supra note
69, at 590 (defining "enterprise" to mean any affiliated group of corporations without regard to
the economic relationships between the entities).
108. A "conglomerate" firm is defined as: "[a] firm comprising a holding company and a
diverse group of subsidiary companies which are generally unrelated in their activities and
markets." THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 77 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed.
1986).
109. This characterization of vertically integrated firms is important to understanding the
type of risks limited liability imposes on creditors of the group. To the extent that the eco-
nomic relationship involves numerous transactions in goods and services, legal protections
against misappropriation risk are less effective. See infra text accompanying notes 201-215.
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of organizational relationship involves fewer transfers of goods and serv-
ices between entities, but may involve regular transfers of cash.
Admittedly, the precise category into which particular groups fall
may be difficult to discern in some cases. Many corporate groups may
include both types of relationships. Assuming for the moment that the
various forms of organization are distinct will lead to a clearer under-
standing of the need for a baseline rule of limited liability under various
forms of corporate organization. 110
The economic relationship between members of corporate groups
directly impacts the need for limiting liability between the constituent
members of the group. As more fully developed below, limited liability
may be necessary to facilitate the effective functioning of horizontally
related and conglomerate organizations. In these contexts, a baseline
rule of limited liability may comport more closely with creditor and
shareholder desires, resulting in fewer instances of contracting around
the general rule. In contrast, vertically integrated corporations are less
dependent on the need to limit liability. A baseline rule of limited liabil-
ity in this context may actually increase transaction costs if more credi-
tors desire to opt out of the rule through contract.
A. The Organization of Production
Why do firms make instead of buy inputs to production? What fac-
tors limit the size of firms? Why do some firms invest in diverse busi-
nesses rather than distribute excess capital to shareholders? The answers
to these questions depend on how adequately product and capital mar-
kets adjust capital and other inputs to a firm's production needs in light
of the costs of contracting. These costs may also give rise to managerial
structures designed to coordinate production and capital allocation
effectively.
Take first a firm's decision to integrate vertically."' There are a
number of reasons why producers may choose to unify component parts
of production within a firm. Components may be technologically insepa-
rable as in the integration of iron making with steel making. Both opera-
tions require heat; coordinating both stages of steel production within
110. This assumption is relaxed at infra text accompanying notes 221-224.
111. Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase's The Nature of the Firm is a traditional starting point
in any analysis of the organization of production. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA N. S. 386 (1937), reprinted in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 18-33 (Williamson
and Winter eds. 1991). In The Nature of the Firm, Coase questioned the organization of pro-
duction in firms rather than markets and presented a theory of organization focusing on the
costs of using the price (market) system. Id. at 21.
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one firm may help realize thermal economies. 1 2 Transportation costs
may also be saved by integrating operations. I I 3 Producers may also
choose to integrate into retailing to eliminate freeriding problems."14
While many of these concerns are solvable by unifying ownership
and control of the successive stages of production, they are also theoreti-
cally solvable through contract. Iron and steel manufacturers could op-
erate "cheek-by-jowl" 115 and divide any gains realized through thermal
economies by contract. Transportation costs could be saved in a similar
manner. Contractual vertical restraints could also solve freerider
problems. 16 Because contracting is theoretically available to reduce
these costs, a more powerful explanation of vertical integration is neces-
sary. One such explanation is that vertical integration reduces transac-
tion costs. Because contracting across markets increases transaction
costs,"17 direct allocation of inputs through firms may be an attractive
way to decrease these costs." 8
112. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI-
TRUST IMPLICATIONS 83 (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES]; see
also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (presenting a similar explanation of integration
focusing on the interdependence of labor).
113. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 88 (1985)
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS].
114. "Free-riding is the diversion of value from a business rival's efforts without pay-
ment." Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Ptnshp. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667,
675 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992); see also Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Bays-
inger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Con-
tracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009,
1023-28 (1983) (describing the different types of freeriding that manufacturers experience).
115. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 113, at 88.
116. See generally Butler & Baysinger, supra note 114, at 1023-28 (discussing freerider
problem in context of synthesis of contract law, economics, and organization theory).
117. See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 112, at 17. Williamson
examines the source of transaction costs in depth. He notes that "bounded rationality" (a
rationality assumption that recognizes limits on an economic actor's ability to act in accord-
ance with perfect information) limits parties' abilities to enter into comprehensive long-term
contracts. Id. at 91. Less comprehensive long-term contracting, an alternative to integration,
may lead to opportunism. Id. at 91-93. Shorter term contracting may give rise to small num-
bers problems and opportunism. Id. at 26-28. All of these problems create transaction costs,
making vertical integration a more attractive alternative.
118. For a thorough explanation of this theory of the firm, see WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 113, at 85-102, and WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES,
supra note 112, at 82-105. See also Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297-98 (1978) (citing post-
contractual opportunistic behavior as a cost of using the market system). Transaction costs
increase the marginal cost (supply) curve resulting in reduced output. A profit maximizing
firm will seek to reduce these costs often by unifying the operations under common ownership.
Although contracting across markets increases transaction costs, in-
tegration increases governance costs.'1 9 In complex, vertically integrated
organizations, management may find that necessary information is diffi-
cult to obtain and that subordinate managers refuse to cooperate.120 An
increase in firm size may decrease management's ability to operate the
integrated organization effectively. Correspondingly, the marginal sav-
ings of integration decrease as the firm grows.'12
The increase in governance costs constrains not only the depth of
integration but also the breadth of firm operations. Governance costs
curtail the geographic and product line scope of firm operations. Man-
agement personnel that are skilled in running automobile manufacturing,
for example, may realize managerial economies of scale by expanding the
firm's operations horizontally through a merger or a start-up. But, at
some point, the administrative costs of managing the production of an
additional product may offset the benefits of an operationally skilled
management. 12 2
These costs can be reduced by selecting the appropriate managerial
structure. Professor Oliver Williamson has developed an analytical
model of firm organization that focuses on the way the management of
production is divisionalized.12 3 The unitary form, or U-form, enterprise
is divided into operating units along functional lines. 124 The vertically
integrated firm with purchasing, manufacturing, sales, and finance unit
managers reporting to a central executive staff exemplifies this form of
enterprise.' 2 5 Increased governance costs limit the radial expansion of
vertically integrated firms that are organized in such a manner. 126 Ex-
pansion into new products and geographic operations attenuates the cen-
tral staff's ability to direct the operational aspects of such firms. This
lack of control by the central management creates autonomy in the func-
119. See generally WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 113, at 131-62
(discussing the incentive and bureaucratic features of firms); WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES, supra note 112, at 117-31 (discussing the limits of vertical integration and firm
size).
120. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 112, at 124-26.
121. See id.; see also Coase, supra note 11I, at 28 (noting that as a firm gets larger there
may be decreasing returns).
122. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 112, at 117, 126-29.
123. See generally WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 113, at 279-85 (re-
viewing the development of the divisionalized corporate form); WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES, supra note 112, at 132-54 (examining unitary, multidivisional, and holding en-
terprise forms).
124. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 112, at 133.
125. Id. at 133-34.
126. See id. at 134-35.
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tional unit heads who may not have enterprise-wide profit pursuit in
mind. 127
In response to these problems, Williamson describes the rise of the
multi-divisional structure, or M-form firm. 128 Management authority
within M-form organizations is divided by product, brand, or geographic
lines rather than along functional lines.1 29 Such divisions may be hori-
zontally related or unrelated (conglomerate) U-form organizations that
are small enough to be managed efficiently.1 30
The M-form firm is characterized by senior management that is in-
sulated from the operational decisions taking place within the firm.' 3 '
By freeing senior managers from the day-to-day operational decisions,
the M-form structure allows them to function as specialized owners,
making many of the decisions ordinarily made by the capital markets. 132
The executive office functions more effectively than the capital market by
monitoring the performance of operational managers and setting incen-
tives through salaries and status.' 33 Because of the managerial authority
afforded by the ownership of all of the equity in the operating companies,
these miniature capital markets may enjoy monitoring efficiencies not
available to the broader capital market. 134
127. Id. at 135.
128. Id. at 136.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 136-37.
131. Id. at 137-38.
132. See generally id. at 143-48. Williamson's goal in analyzing these types of organiza-
tional forms is to prescribe an efficient method of organizing, rather than to state the way
corporations actually do organize. Thus, he argues that the M-form firm is the most efficient
means of organizing behavior: "The organization and operation of the large enterprise along
the lines of the M-form favors goal pursuit and least-cost behavior more nearly associated with
the neoclassical profit maximization hypothesis than does the U-form organizational alterna-
tive." Id. at 150.
133. Id. at 145-46. The M-Form structure may alleviate many of the problems created by
the separation of ownership from control in large corporations. Commentators have spent a
substantial amount of intellectual energy analyzing the agency costs that such a separation
generates. See, eg., Coffee, supra note 70, at 25-26; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fis-
chel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 401-03 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EON. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301, 304 (1983).
Williamson has argued that "the M-Form structure and its conglomerate variant have
served to attenuate aspects of the managerial discretion problem." Oliver E. Williamson, Or-
ganization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 351, 366 (1983).
134. Williamson elaborates as follows:
The advantages of the general office over the capital market in auditing respects
are of two kinds. First, division managers are subordinates; as such, both their ac-
counting records and backup files are appropriate subjects for review. Stockholders,
by contrast, are much more limited in what they can demand in the way of
disclosure.
More fundamentally, Williamson asserts that the M-form firm also
replaces the capital market in assigning excess cash flows to their best
(highest yield) uses. 135 This method of capital allocation is seen as more
efficient than allocation through the general capital market because it
reduces the costs of information dissemination, thus allowing a "sequen-
tial decision process (in which additional financing is conditional on prior
stage results and developing contingencies) .... ," 36 In essence, William-
son argues that the unification of diverse businesses within the M-form
structure allows a faster and better informed allocation of capital than
can be accomplished through capital markets.
In addition to being an effective method of organizing broad, hori-
zontally related manufacturing processes, the M-form structure may help
to explain the rise of the conglomerate. 137 The M-form's superior moni-
toring capabilities coupled with the relative ease of replacing its opera-
tional managers can reduce agency costs at the operating company
level. 1 38 Williamson further contends that the M-form's superior infor-
mation gathering ability makes the miniature capital market a more effi-
cient structure within which to allocate capital.1 39
While Williamson's organizational theory may be descriptively pow-
erful, several commentators have pointed to difficulties that may render
the theory normatively weak when applied to the "true" conglomer-
ate.140 The monitoring efficiencies of the M-form firm may not be as
great as Williamson asserts. 141 Also, even if monitoring efficiencies are
present at the executive office level, the ultimate shareholders still need to
Second, the general office can expect knowledgeable parties to be much more
cooperative than can an outsider. Thus, whereas disclosure of sensitive internal in-
formation to an outsider is apt to be interpreted as an act of treachery, internal dis-
closure is unlikely to be regarded opprobriously.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 112, at 146-47.
135. Id. at 147.
136. Id. at 148.
137. The rise of the conglomerate raises the following question: Why do firms choose to
invest earnings in non-integrated business operations rather than distribute the earnings to
shareholders for re-deployment and diversification? Because shareholders themselves can di-
versify away non-systematic risk, there is really no additional benefit to be gained by further
diversification at the firm level. Leebron, supra note 15, at 1617.
138. See supra note 133.
139. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 112, at 147-48.
140. The true conglomerate is a corporate group with operational subsidiaries sharing no
obvious operational or managerial synergies.
141. Coffee, supra note 70, at 33 ("[S]ome evidence has shown that diversification at the
shareholder level has outperformed conglomerate firms. This is hardly the result one would
expect if the modern conglomerate had superior monitoring ability.").
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monitor the central management. 142 Finally, several commentators have
suggested that the M-form's superior capital allocation properties may be
overstated. 143 While the M-form innovation makes the growth of firms
possible, it does not place the necessary constraints on over-diversifica-
tion at the corporate level. 44
Still, the M-form structure does lead to managerial efficiencies in
many corporations. Even though the monitoring efficiencies created by
the structure may lead to excessive and inefficient growth, there may be
many cases in which the form provides net benefits. A closely related
issue is the problem of definition: What one person may see as over-
diversification, another may see as appropriate horizontal expansion.
B. The Effects of Limited Liability on Organizational Form
Williamson's analytical model of firm organization does not address
the risk allocation structures necessary to M-Form and U-Form struc-
tures. Still, his model suggests an approach to the problem of limited
liability in corporate groups that focuses on the economic relationships
between various components of the group. Vertically integrated, U-form
organizations do not require separate incorporation of components
within the production process to realize their efficiencies. There is no
indication that the savings in transaction costs associated with unifying
ownership of inputs is dependent on the ability to separate the operations
of vertically integrated firms into distinct subsidiaries.
142. As Coffee states:
One possibility is, of course, that the managerialists could be more right than Profes-
sor Williamson. That is, the growth of the conglomerate could owe more to the
growth-maximizing preferences of managers, who are seeking to build a diversified
portfolio within a single firm, than to its greater efficiency as Professor Williamson
postulates. A more balanced interpretation might be that the advent of the M-Form
Firm facilitated corporate growth, including inefficient growth ....
Coffee, supra note 70, at 32.
143. See, eg., Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for
Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 312 n.250 (1983) ("The M-form may have encouraged
too much emphasis on short-term financial management at the expense of longer term product
and market development.").
144. The M-form organizational structure may allow managers to expand a corporation's
operations beyond the point at which the operations can be effectively monitored. To the
extent that M-form conglomerates have grown to such a size that managerial efficiencies are
lost, investors would likely prefer a distribution of earnings that they could invest in a diversi-
fied portfolio. See Coffee, supra note 70, at 31-35.
Williamson recognizes that abuses of the form have occurred and will continue: "Lest I
be misunderstood, I do not mean to suggest that opportunities to express managerial prefer-
ences in ways that conflict with the preferences of the stockholders have been extinguished as a
result of the conglomerate form." WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 113, at
289.
In fact, separating components of a vertically integrated operation
into subsidiaries may increase transaction costs because creditors may
insist on guarantees from the subsidiaries holding other components.
Williamson and others have illustrated that one of the primary determi-
nants of vertical integration is asset specificity. 145 When assets necessary
to a particular production process have limited usefulness outside of that
process, ownership integration is more likely to occur because of the diffi-
culty of contracting between multiple owners of various specialized in-
puts. 14 6 This condition can be expected to impact creditors as well,
causing at least sophisticated creditors to seek guarantees that ensure
that their claims extend to the entire production process.
The efficiency of firms with horizontally related production
processes, particularly those operating under an M-form structure, may
require that courts give more deference to separate incorporation and
limited liability. Firms must be able to separate and insulate productive
assets along product, market, or geographic lines in order to realize fully
the efficiencies associated with the operation of the businesses within a
miniature capital market.
Further, when there is no physical asset specificity between subsidi-
aries operating in a corporate group, lenders may be able to extend credit
on the basis of the assets and operations of a single member of the corpo-
rate group. Therefore, the economic justifications for the limitation of
liability are strongest in situations of horizontal or conglomerate
organization. 147
IV. Corporate Risk Relationships-A Model Of Risk Analysis
In determining whether limited or unlimited liability is appropriate
as a baseline rule, it is not enough simply to point to the managerial
efficiencies associated with various organizational forms. An inquiry into
the effects of the rules on the relationships among the firm's capital con-
tributors is also required. This Part examines the effect of limited liabil-
145. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 113, at 90-96.
146. Asset specificity creates a quasi-rent that is subject to the risk of appropriation by
opportunistic contracting partners. Klein et al., supra note 118, at 298.
147. Other commentators have approached similar conclusions. Blumberg discussed the
impact of economic integration of corporate groups on consolidation but did not distinguish
between horizontal and vertical integration. BLUMBERG, supra note 35, at 416-20. He con-
cluded that "[a] demonstration that the related companies have conducted an economically
integrated unitary business, while in and of itself important, is not always decisive." Id. at 420.
In analyzing the effect of limited liability on tort claimants, Leebron also pointed to the
effect of integration (though not necessarily vertical integration) on the justifications for lim-
ited liability. Leebron, supra note 15, at 1616-17.
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ity on the risks creditors face. It divides risk into two components-
enterprise risk and misappropriation risk. 148 While both types of risk are
present in any debtor-creditor relationship, limited liability within corpo-
rate groups increases misappropriation risk by providing increased op-
portunities for wealth transfers from shareholders to creditors. Thus,
while limited liability may reduce transaction costs associated with mar-
ket based risk allocations, it may increase the cost of controlling misap-
propriation risk.
A. Enterprise and Misappropriation Risk
The debate between Landers and Posner illustrates the essential ten-
sion between the desire to protect creditors against risk through legal
rules and the concerns regarding the interference of such rules with mar-
ket resolutions of risk allocation problems. 149 The first step in the resolu-
tion of this tension, however, must be to clarify what the term "risk"
means. There are at least two types of risks with which a system of cor-
porate law must be concerned.
First there is enterprise risk-the expected variability of the earn-
ings of a business at any point in time. Obviously, even if all of the cor-
porate participants are pure of heart and acting in good faith, creditors
face the risk that companies may ultimately fail and be unable to pay
their debts. At some level, the risk of failure cannot be eliminated-
changes in consumer preferences, natural disasters, limitations on mana-
gerial prowess, and the like present risks that the enterprise will fail
notwithstanding the good faith efforts of all of the participants.
Enterprise risk does not, however, fully explain the tensions arising
in the creditor-shareholder relationship. This relationship also gives rise
to misappropriation risk-a risk that the corporation's management will
attempt to shift corporate wealth to the shareholders at the expense of
the creditors. The most obvious example of misappropriation is the mis-
representation of the financial status of the business to potential credi-
tors. By misrepresenting the nature and extent of enterprise risk, the
business may obtain credit when it otherwise would not have attracted
financing or a lower interest rate than it otherwise would have paid.150
148. See infra text accompanying notes 149-155 for definitions of "enterprise risk" and
"misappropriation risk."
149. Landers characterized the distinction between him and Posner in the following way:
"Professor Posner perceives the 'consortium of banks' as the paradigm group of creditors ....
I find in the bankruptcy cases large numbers of involuntary, high-information-cost, and trade
creditors who simply are not obtaining adequate protection under the present system." Land-
ers, Another Word, supra note 14, at 540.
150. Even Posner would abrogate limited liability when the corporate group has affirma-
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Of more interest in an examination of limited liability are potential
misappropriations occurring after credit is extended. Creditors that op-
erate under a regime of limited liability are always subject to risks of
misappropriation after the interest rate of debt is fixed. 151 Increasing this
risk after fixing the interest rate allows the shareholders to benefit be-
cause the value of their shares depends on the variability of the income
stream to which they look for payment.' 52 Creditors control this risk
through contract. Contractual covenants may shift ownership of the as-
sets to the creditors' 53 when events increase risk beyond that contem-
plated by the parties in setting the interest rate.
Misappropriation risk may not appear to differ radically from enter-
prise risk. Both may be the subject of creditor contracting. Moreover,
the process by which creditors bargain with management over the appro-
priate levels of both of these types of risk may converge. In credit rela-
tionships, however, the concepts are separate. The essential distinction
between the two kinds of risk is that while misappropriation risk is sub-
ject to contractual control, enterprise risk is subject only to contractual
allocation.
Enterprise risk, the expected variability of the earnings of the busi-
ness at any point in time, affects all of the owners of inputs to the produc-
tion process. 154 It may be reduced through a variety of means, but
because it is an estimated value at a given point in time, it cannot be
controlled. 155 Misappropriation risk, an uncompensated change in enter-
prise risk, looks to future actions designed to benefit shareholders at the
tively misrepresented its corporate structure to creditors. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
supra note 85, at 406-07; Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28, at 521-24.
151. See Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 108-11 (1992); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 261 (1988); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior,
and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 645, 653-60 (1992).
152. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,
J. POL. ECON. 637, 649-53 (1972); see also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at
395-96 (providing a numerical example of this point).
153. See Frost, supra note 151, at 109-11; Clifford W. Smith Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On
Financial Contracting, An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcON. 117, 152 (1979) (ob-
serving that debt covenants reduce the agency costs of debt). Contractual covenants cannot
completely eliminate the risk of misappropriation. See infra text accompanying notes 170-175.
154. This Article focuses on contributors of capital, as opposed to contributors of labor or
physical supplies.
155. Consider the negotiations leading to an extension of credit. Even though a lender
may make suggestions intended to reduce enterprise risk and may require covenants designed
to inform it of events that increase enterprise risk, there will always be some variability in the
earnings of the business. This variability (risk) cannot be reduced any further and thus must
be allocated through the interest rate.
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expense of creditors. Therefore, it is subject to contractual or legal
control.
The control-allocation distinction is critical to an understanding of
the interplay between legal rules and contractual mechanisms in corpo-
rate risk relationships. Allocations of enterprise risk necessarily occur in
all corporate debt relationships. Creditors expect some variability in
earnings at the time they extend credit. Therefore, the risk that variabil-
ity represents must be allocated among the shareholders and creditors.
The relative allocation of this risk through off-the-rack rules is only a
starting point and the parties may reallocate or adjust compensation for
risk bearing. In fact, off-the-rack rules, if well understood by the parties,
may not be particularly relevant to actual allocations. As the following
discussion illustrates, however, control of misappropriation risk presents
a greater role for legal rules.
The differences between the two types of risk is illustrated by the
Landers-Posner debate. 156 Landers was primarily concerned with the in-
crease in misappropriation risk. 157 By contrast, while Posner considered
misappropriation risk,15 8 he seemed more concerned with the allocation
of enterprise risk.159 Their approaches conflict because the desirability of
enterprise risk allocation through the baseline limited liability rule may
substantially increase misappropriation risk.
B. Misappropriation Risk in the Corporate Group
Misappropriation risk in the context of corporate groups not only
pits shareholders against creditors but also raises conflicts among credi-
tors of related entities. While inevitable in any credit relationship, the
failure of a corporate group spotlights these creditor-shareholder and
creditor-creditor conflicts, because financial failure normally engenders a
complete breakdown in the contractual framework of the business. In
large part, the conflicts are regulated by the explicit contracts of the vari-
ous participants in the corporate enterprise, but these contracts are nego-
tiated with an eye toward the "standardized contracts" provided by
corporate and bankruptcy law.
Misappropriation risk can take several forms. After fixing the inter-
est rate of debt, shareholders may increase enterprise risk by withdraw-
156. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
157. Landers, Unified Approach, supra note 69, at 595-96.
158. Posner explained the dichotomy as "problems of information" (herein enterprise risk)
and "problems of supervision" (herein misappropriation risk). Posner, Affiliated Corporations,
supra note 28, at 507-09.
159. Id. at 515-16.
ing assets from the corporation, substituting riskier assets for existing
assets, purchasing risky assets through new debt issuance, and by forego-
ing valuable investment opportunities. 160 While these varied forms of
misappropriation risk are inevitable in any credit relationship, limited
liability within corporate groups creates an opportunity to engage in
transactions designed to withdraw corporate assets in ways that existing
constraints may not adequately control.161 In these situations, the impo-
sition of a different baseline rule may be the only answer. 162
Creditor-shareholder conflicts are inevitable in any lending relation-
ship. Credit relationships imply differing claims on the cash flow and
asset structure of the business. 163 Both creditors and shareholders de-
mand a return based partly on the risk of the business operations. Be-
cause the priority of credit claims reduces the risk of non-payment,
creditors can demand a lower rate of return than that demanded by
shareholders. Once the interest rate on debt is fixed, creditors are subject
to the risk that shareholders will take actions to increase the risk of the
enterprise beyond that taken into account by the interest rate. In this
manner, shareholders may transfer wealth from the creditors to
themselves.
Take the most obvious example: a dividend payment from a subsidi-
ary corporation to its parent. All other things being unchanged, such a
dividend payment can be expected to increase the enterprise risk faced by
the subsidiary's creditors because it reduces the assets subject to their
claims without increasing the value relevant to them. 164 The ultimate
shareholders of the parent corporation may seek the payment in order to
increase the subsidiary's enterprise risk and to correspondingly reduce
the parent corporation's enterprise risk. In the absence of any con-
straints, shareholders can be expected to insist on some level of dividend
payments, because such payments reduce the total value of assets subject
to prior claims. 165
Creditor-creditor conflicts are perhaps less obvious but are nonethe-
less present in the multi-tiered corporate structure. However, they are
160. Picker, supra note 151, at 653.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 167-201.
162. See infra notes 182-215 and accompanying text.
163. Frost, supra note 151, at 108-09.
164. Black & Scholes, supra note 152, at 651 ("Even for dividends of modest size, a higher
dividend always favors the stockholders at the expense of the bond holders.").
165. Of course, in many situations, shareholders will attempt to completely isolate the
assets by requiring a further distribution from the parent to themselves. However, the transfer
from the subsidiary to the parent may constitute a misappropriation even without a further
distribution.
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likely to be derivative of the creditor-shareholder conflicts described
above. In the dividend example, the motivation for the dividend pay-
ment may have been to benefit the ultimate shareholders of the group,
but this transfer also altered the enterprise risk allocation between the
creditors of the subsidiary and the creditors of the parent by shifting as-
sets between the entities.
Dividend payments present the most obvious example of misappro-
priation risk and are perhaps the easiest type of transaction to control.
They also illustrate a type of transaction that is not unique to corporate
groups. Any creditor lending to a business or individual is subject to the
risk that its borrower will dissipate assets and thereby increase enterprise
risk.
Misappropriation risk in corporate groups may be much more subtle
than the particular form of misappropriation risk discussed in the forego-
ing example. When there are numerous intercompany transfers of goods
and services between affiliated entities, the common managers of the
group may price the transfers in order to benefit one of the two entities.
For example, consider a vertically integrated corporate group consisting
of separately incorporated manufacturing and sales components. As-
sume further that the shareholders of the group's parent seek to increase
the assets of the sales component (Sales) at the expense of the manufac-
turing component (Manufacturing). 166 In order to shift assets between
the components, the common management might price transfers from
Manufacturing to Sales at a low enough level to ensure that Manufactur-
ing incurs continuing losses while Sales earns abnormally high profits.
The economic effect of such a scheme is no different from that yielded in
the previous dividend example. Through transfer pricing, the manage-
ment of the group may shift assets from Manufacturing to Sales in order
to avoid the claims of Manufacturing's creditors.
Both dividend payments and subsidized transfer pricing reduce the
assets available to pay the debts of one of the members of the group and
increase the assets of another. Because total liabilities remain un-
changed, shifting assets through dividends or intercompany transactions
necessarily shifts risk between the various entities within the corporate
group. Whether these transactions ultimately benefit the shareholders or
the creditors of a particular entity is beside the point. For all creditors,
166. Even if Manufacturing and Sales are not in a parent-subsidiary relationship, a shift in
assets may benefit the shareholders of the parent corporation. If one of the corporations has
incurred significantly more debt than the other, a shift in assets from the leveraged member of
the group to the unleveraged insulates those assets and benefits the ultimate shareholders.
the limitation of liability results in a potentially uncompensated shift in
the asset base to which they may look for payment.
But this is not to condemn either intragroup transactions or divi-
dend payments. Obviously, both are normal, expected practices in many
corporations. These illustrations simply show that limited liability cre-
ates a situation in which a transfer of assets becomes relevant to credi-
tors. The desirability of restricting these types of transfers does not
follow directly from the observation that such transfers may create a po-
tential for misappropriation. Much of the risk of misappropriation may
be limited by contractual, reputational, and governance constraints.
There remain, however, practical limitations on the effectiveness of these
control devices. In the absence of legal constraints, these limitations
would allow corporations to externalize some of the risk of their opera-
tions through misappropriation.
C. Constraints Against Misappropriation Risk
Limiting liability within corporate groups increases misappropria-
tion risk by enabling management to shift assets among the entities of the
group. One answer to this problem is to eliminate limited liability as a
baseline rule. Alternatively, the increase in misappropriation risk may
not be significant given the many constraints on such behavior.
While any lending relationship presents opportunities for misappro-
priation, there are several constraints on such behavior. For example,
the reputational damage caused by misappropriations is likely to impair
the ability of the business to survive as a going concern. Therefore,
shareholders may be unlikely to insist on such wealth transfers. Contrac-
tual covenants may further restrict dividend payments and intercompany
transactions. Creditors may also obtain guaranties and security interests
to reduce misappropriation risk. In large corporations, the shareholders'
lack of control over the management of the corporate group may dimin-
ish misappropriation risk. While each of these constraints reduces mis-
appropriation risk, all provide incomplete protection. Legal remedies,
the subject of the following Part, are necessary to supplement the forego-
ing constraints.
(1) Reputational Constraints
Reputational concerns may provide a powerful constraint against
misappropriation in the context of the financially healthy business.
Shareholders that are interested in maintaining their investment in a go-
ing concern are unlikely to cause management to substantially increase
the risk to creditors, because to do so would increase the cost of ob-
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taining future credit.1 67 Assuming self-interested actors, however, this
control on misappropriation risk applies only when the present value of
maintaining a going concern is greater than the present value of the bene-
fits derived from the misappropriation. 168 In addition, the benefits of
maintaining a going concern must be discounted by the probability of
firm failure in the future.1 69 Therefore, shareholders of firms with sub-
stantial financial problems may rationally choose to forego the benefits of
continuing to maintain the business in favor of transfers of wealth to
themselves.
(2) Contractual Constraints
Explicit contracting works relatively well to reduce misappropria-
tion risk facing institutional creditors.170 Institutional creditors are
likely to have better information regarding this risk and may more easily
set an appropriate interest rate.171 They may bargain for contractual
provisions that limit dividends and intercompany transactions. 72 Even
if such provisions are ineffective or the costs of negotiating them too
high, both lenders of substantial funds and management will have incen-
tives to contract around the limited liability rule by obtaining either the
guaranty of other members of the group173 or a security interest in par-
ticular assets. 174
167. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 51.
168. Id. ("There is no 'externality' except in the last period-that is, the time after which
the firm no longer contemplates raising new money in capital markets.").
169. As a firm encounters financial difficulties, the expected value of the firm as a going
concern will decrease. If the benefit to shareholders from a particular asset shift remains con-
stant, the likelihood that the value of that shift will exceed the loss caused by a damaged
reputation will increase. Thus, misappropriation is more likely to occur in times of financial
distress. See Frost, supra note 151, at 109.
170. A reduction in misappropriation risk ex ante benefits all of the participants in the
corporate group. To the extent that the management of the group is able to provide such
contractual protection to the creditors, the shareholders will be benefitted by a reduction in the
interest rate the creditors will charge. These contractual constraints carry their own costs,
however, by reducing managerial flexibility. Thus capital contributors will most likely bargain
for a level of contractual protection that is consistent with their cost-benefit criterion.
171. See Landers, Another Word, supra note 14, at 540 ("I hardly doubt the ability of the
banks to protect themselves.").
172. See Smith & Warner, supra note 153, at 130-35 (dividend restrictions). Restrictions
on intercompany transactions have not been fully analyzed by commentators, but these restric-
tions could be useful in reducing the misappropriation risk facing lenders of separately incor-
porated components of vertically integrated production processes.
173. If misappropriation risk stems from the limitation of liability, a guaranty, which ab-
rogates the limitation, may reduce that risk.
174. See Picker, supra note 151, at 654 ('[S]ecured credit itself can be understood as [an]
attempt to reduce debtor misbehavior .... ").
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Smaller voluntary creditors may have more difficulty protecting
themselves by contract. Small suppliers and employees may not fully
appreciate the misappropriation risk they face when dealing with a mem-
ber of a corporate group. The absolute level of indebtedness owed to any
particular supplier may be inadequate to support the transaction costs
involved in understanding the risk and providing contractual protection.
This factor may be particularly problematic when a supplier is dealing
with a separately incorporated but vertically integrated operation. The
supplier may not fully appreciate the misappropriation risk that is cre-
ated by the fact that the entity with which it is doing business does not
include all of the assets of the entire integrated business. 75 Finally, ob-
taining better information entails transaction costs that might be avoided
by abrogating limited liability in the corporate group. 76
(3) Governance Constraints
Misappropriation risk is significantly controlled by the corporate
governance structure of the borrowing entity. This model of risk analysis
has thus far assumed that shareholders can cause management to engage
in behavior that results in a misappropriation. In many circumstances,
however, shareholders may lack effective control over the management of
the corporate group. In this case, managers may have less of an incentive
to shift assets among the members of the group.
Lack of shareholder control over management has been the subject
of extensive commentary and analysis. In large corporations, share-
holder voting and other control devices have been shown to be less than
effective means of aligning the incentives of managers with those of the
shareholders.17 7 Diversification17 8 has resulted in widespread holdings of
small numbers of shares. The small stake held by individual sharehold-
ers limits their incentive to control managerial actions.
This separation of ownership from control redounds to the benefit of
creditors. Because managers are heavily invested in the firm and are un-
175. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 408-09 (noting the potential for
misrepresentation in separately incorporated but vertically integrated corporations).
176. See Landers, Another Word, supra note 14, at 530-32 (citing high information costs as
prohibiting small creditors from protecting themselves through contract). Even institutional
creditors may not adequately protect themselves with contractual covenants. See McDaniel,
supra note 151, at 236-38 (noting studies indicating a lack of contractual protection).
177. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 247-76 (1948). See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan,
A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1079-
82 (1990) (analyzing how a shareholder's lack of adequate incentives to acquire information
and to lead control contests affects these contests).
178. See supra note 70.
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able to diversify their firm-specific skills, they are likely to be risk-
averse.1 79 Thus, while shareholders may desire to increase enterprise risk
after the interest rate of debt is fixed, managers may be reluctant to do so.
The shareholders' inability to have complete control over the manage-
ment of the corporate group reduces their opportunity to engage in
misappropriations.180
Governance structures do not, however, eliminate the problem of
misappropriation risk. First, many corporations are not controlled by an
autonomous management. In many small, closely held corporations,
managers hold a significant percentage of the equity interests and may,
therefore, have an incentive to engage in asset shifting. Second, if the
corporation is in financial difficulty, managers may choose to move assets
from the weakest entities to those entities that have the best chance of
survival.""
The inadequacy of the constraints against misappropriation risk af-
fects all credit relationships. If all lenders could rely on these con-
straints, there would be no reason for the law to provide further
protection. Creditors would simply choose the level of protection at
which they were willing to lend and demand an interest rate sufficient to
compensate them for any remaining enterprise and misappropriation
risk. While they would choose incorrectly some of the time, they could
not complain that the system somehow treated them unfairly.
Transaction costs weaken these controls on misappropriation risk by
limiting the ability of many lenders to understand the reputational and
governance constraints and to tailor their contractual constraints to par-
ticular deals. Many lenders, such as wage claimants and suppliers, are
simply unable to incur the transaction costs necessary to both gaining an
understanding of and dealing with the misappropriation risk presented
by a particular situation. In any event, the costs of negotiating appropri-
ate constraints can be eliminated by structuring a protective off-the-rack
rule.
V. Legal Constraints Against Misappropriation Risk
As illustrated above, the transaction cost analysis of limited liability
within corporate groups creates a paradox. If transaction costs are to be
179. See Coffee, supra note 70, at 19.
180. See Frost, supra note 151, at 109.
181. As a firm encounters financial difficulties, managers may be willing to raid weaker
elements of the business in order to obtain operating capital to bolster stronger elements.
Again, while this approach may be beneficial to the entity as a whole, it may increase the
likelihood of the failure of a weaker subsidiary in a way that was not contemplated by that
subsidiary's creditors.
minimized, the rule allocating enterprise risk should approximate what
parties would bargain for in the absence of such a rule. If this alloca-
tional rule is limited liability, misappropriation risk may increase. This
tension can be partially resolved by expanding the analysis to include off-
the-rack rules designed to counter the ill effects of the limited liability
regime.
Controlling misappropriation risk may involve increased transaction
costs so great that many creditors will forego contractual protections.
This Part incorporates the protection provided by the fraudulent transfer
laws into the transaction cost analysis. 182 While limited liability within
the corporate group may exacerbate misappropriation risk, creditors'
legal protections, such as those furnished by fraudulent transfer laws,
provide a remedy for misappropriation. To the extent that this remedy
adequately controls misappropriation risk, it is consistent with a transac-
tion cost approach.183 As illustrated below, however, fraudulent transfer
laws may provide inadequate protection against misappropriation risk
occurring in separately incorporated but vertically integrated members of
corporate groups. This failure may allow a corporation to externalize
some of its enterprise risk.
A. Fraudulent Transfer Law
Aside from any contractual protection creditors have negotiated,
creditors are assured that corporate transactions that drastically impair
the financial condition of the business may be remedied. Section 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code 184 and its state law counterparts, the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) 185 and the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA), 186 are designed as recovery mechanisms for par-
ticular transfers that increase creditors' risk beyond that incorporated
182. By and large, the entity-enterprise debate seems to have disregarded the role of off-
the-rack protective rules; however, the transaction cost analysis is incomplete without further
consideration of the effect of such protections on the credit contract. Cf. Landers, Unified
Approach, supra note 69, at 592-95 (dismissing fraudulent transfer laws and dividend restric-
tion statutes as "rather narrow").
183. Fiduciary duties to minority shareholders exemplify off-the-rack protective rules.
Minority shareholders are positioned similarly to creditors of corporate groups. Managers
may have an incentive to engage in transactions designed to benefit the majority shareholders
at the expense of the minority-a species of misappropriation risk. See generally J.A.C. Heth-
erington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 9 (1987) (analyzing conflicts between the interests of the controlling and
minority shareholders).
184. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
185. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 430 (1918) [hereinafter
UFCA].
186. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 643 (1984) [hereinafter UFTA].
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into the interest rate. In addition to voiding transfers made with the
intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud" 187 creditors, section 548 also voids
constructively fraudulent transfers-transfers made for "less than [a]
reasonably equivalent value" during periods in which the present or con-
templated financial condition of the business falls below particular
benchmarks.188
The dividend transfer problem'8 9 provides the most obvious applica-
tion of the constructive fraudulent transfer laws: The dividend transfer
between the parent and subsidiary is made for "less than [a] reasonably
equivalent value," because it results in a reduction in capital without a
corresponding increase in the value of the assets to which creditors may
look for payment.190 If the subsidiary is "insolvent," the transfer is re-
coverable from the parent. 191 If, on the other hand, the subsidiary is
solvent and the financial standard for creditor protection has not other-
wise been met, the creditors of the subsidiary are not protected. 192
Dividend payments present one of the simplest examples of the ap-
plication of the constructive fraudulent transfer laws to these sorts of
conflicts. Reasonably equivalent value is clearly lacking, and thus the
question is simply whether the financial performance benchmarks have
187. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988). This provision, as well as UFCA § 7 and UFTA
§ 4(a)(1), protects creditors against actual fraud without regard to the financial condition of
the transferor corporation. While these sections provide substantial protection against misap-
propriation risk, they may be inadequate to combat misappropriations occurring in the ordi-
nary course of the corporate group's business because of the difficulty in proving intent to
defraud.
188. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988). Under section 548, the UFTA and UFCA apply only
when the transferor corporation is in, or anticipates being in, dire financial straits, unless the
transfer was made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. The "construc-
tive" fraudulent transfer provisions of section 548 provide a remedy only when the transferor
is insolvent or has unreasonably small capital, or when the transferor anticipates incurring
indebtedness beyond its ability to repay. See generally Bruce A. Markell, Toward True and
Plain Dealing: 4 Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital, 21
IND. L. REV. 469 (1988) (reviewing the origins and development of the unreasonably small
capital branch of fraudulent transfer law).
189. See supra text accompanying note 166.
190. Dividends are also subject to specific corporate law restrictions. See, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 500 (West 1992); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510
(McKinney 1992); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT. § 45 (1979). These statutes approach the
dividend problem in the same way as fraudulent transfer laws. See CLARK, supra note 65, at
86-90.
191. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988).
192. If the parent corporation pays a further dividend to the ultimate shareholders, a simi-
lar analysis applies to resolve the shareholder/creditor risk allocation. If the financial condi-
tion of the subsidiary is below the threshold set by the fraudulent transfer laws, the creditor of
the subsidiary may seek return of the funds from the shareholders of the parent. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 550(a)(2) (1988).
been met. The concept of a transfer under the fraudulent transfer rules
extends beyond the scope of the obvious transfer found in dividend pay-
ments, however, and can be used to resolve more subtle conflicts.
Constructive fraudulent transfer laws might be applied to remedy
the misappropriation risk raised by the transfer pricing hypothetical. 193
The definition of transfer, under the Code, is broad enough to include
even intercompany sales transactions undertaken in the ordinary course
of business. 194 Under section 548, the UFCA, and the UFTA, a court
examines each transaction to determine whether the property exchanged
was of a reasonably equivalent value. 195 If the exchange fails this test,
the court further inquires whether the subsidiary that received less than
reasonable equivalent value was in poor enough financial condition to
implicate the protection provided by the fraudulent transfer laws. 196
There are, however, several factors that limit the practical effectiveness of
this method of creditor protection.
B. The Conceptual Limitations on Fraudulent Transfer Laws
The transaction costs justification for fraudulent transfer laws re-
quires that these off-the-rack creditor protections be closely circum-
scribed to resemble the bargain that creditors and shareholders would
reach in the absence of transaction costs. 197 Failure to adhere closely to
the bargain model may result in a loss of managerial flexibility and may
provide creditors with protections they would have been willing to relin-
quish by contract. 198 Remedies provided by section 548, the UFCA, and
193. See supra text accompanying note 166.
194. " '[T]ransfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary
or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property ... 
11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (Supp. 11 1990).
195. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988); UFCA § 4 ("fair consideration"); UFTA § 4(a)(2).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B) (1988); UFCA § 4; UFTA § 4(a)(2).
197. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 836 (1985). Judge Posner analyzes dividend restrictions in a
similar manner. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 396.
198. Baird & Jackson, supra note 197, at 834. Addressing fiduciary duties to minority
shareholders, Professor Hetherington observed:
When the courts import substantive obligations into private contracts, those obliga-
tions are certain to differ to some extent from those the parties themselves would
have made. The degree of divergence will, of course, vary. When this divergence is
small, the parties have little to gain by negotiating to modify or avoid the impact of
the law-created term; the greater the divergence, the greater the incentive. Bargain-
ing is costly, and the parties may be expected to engage in it only when the prospec-
tive benefits exceed the costs. In resolving disputes ex post, the efficiency and
productivity of exchange transactions would be enhanced if the courts sought the
allocation which the parties would have made ex ante had they then considered that
the gains of bargaining exceeded the costs.
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the UFTA are limited to transactions that fail a, threshold level of "fair-
ness." In addition, they are restricted in their application to transactions
occurring when the firm is in dire straits or transactions undertaken with
actual intent to defraud.
These limits on the fraudulent transfer remedy highlight concerns
that its application might interfere with explicit contractual expectations
of parties other than the corporation and the protected creditors. A pro-
tective rule allowing creditors to challenge transactions because they
were not good deals for the corporation would inhibit transacting. Third
parties would not be able to rely on their explicit contracts with the cor-
poration. Reassurance given to third parties would require that all credi-
tors agree to the transaction at issue.1 99 By limiting the application of
these remedies to transactions occurring during insolvency or transfers
undertaken with intent to defraud, the fraudulent transfer laws provide
third parties with some means of determining the risk that their contrac-
tual expectations will be upset.2°°
Using fraudulent transfer laws to reallocate assets misappropriated
through transfer pricing directly implicates these concerns. Creditors of
the subsidiary receiving the allegedly fraudulent transfer may have relied
on their borrower's business relationship with its affiliate. If, for exam-
ple, a sales subsidiary enjoys a particularly favorable pricing relationship
with its manufacturing affiliate, the sales subsidiary's creditors may come
to rely on that relationship in setting the terms of the credit relationship.
Creditors of the subsidiary harmed by the relationship may, however,
complain that the arrangement constituted a misappropriation. Despite
these complaints, the potential reliance of sales' creditors requires limita-
tions on the fraudulent transfer remedy. Unless the remedy is limited in
some way, neither group of creditors will have any baseline against
which to develop their expectations.
It is necessary to determine when fraudulent transfer laws should be
applied to the myriad conflicts between parties dealing with an insolvent
corporation. But unlike the application of fraudulent transfer laws to
single transactions, such as dividend payments, the restrictions on the
remedy renders it ineffective to protect against misappropriation result-
ing from a series of transactions that are part of the normal course of
vertically integrated production processes. The application of the fraud-
ulent transfer laws to these intercompany arrangements presents compli-
Hetherington, supra note 183, at 20.
199. Baird & Jackson, supra note 197, at 839. Thus unlike allocational rules, protective
rules are generally not subject to ex ante contractual abrogation. See id. at 835.
200. See id. at 839.
cations that are not present in more general applications. In the dividend
example, the court is presented with a discrete transaction that is clearly
of no value to the subsidiary corporation. The only inquiry is whether
the subsidiary met the financial standard of the fraudulent transfer laws
on the date of the transfer. The intragroup sale of goods problem re-
quires more than a mere inquiry into the fairness of the intercompany
arrangement. Because of the regular nature of the transfers, the court
must also determine precisely when the subsidiary moved from a state of
solvency to insolvency.201 Since there is unlikely to be any one event that
created the condition of insolvency, the line drawing may be relatively
arbitrary.
C. The Transfer Pricing Problem
The difficulty of determining the point of insolvency may be dwarfed
by the difficulties posed by the requirement that the transfers be unfair
for one or the other subsidiary. Such an inquiry is likely to be as com-
plex as it is critical. Transfer pricing analysis requires cost and revenue
allocations that may be beyond the competency of the judicial process.
Thus, fraudulent transfer laws may be inadequate protection against mis-
appropriation risk in transfer pricing situations.
Posner asserts that, while managers may take steps to distort the
profitability of the various members of the corporate group, they are un-
likely to do so because of their need for undistorted information about
the relative profitability of the various components of the group.202 He
concludes that this managerial need will cause most vertically integrated
units of the group to be operated as "profit centers. '20 3 Thus, Posner
would likely conclude that intragroup transactions would not normally
implicate the constructive fraudulent transfer laws because the transac-
tions would be priced at a fair or reasonably equivalent value.
One response to this assertion is that, like reputational limits on mis-
appropriation risk,2°4 the profit center notion provides meaningful pro-
tection only in the context of a going concern. The protection is effective
only insofar as the management of the business finds that the informa-
tional distortions resulting from a pattern of misappropriation cost more
than the expected value of the misappropriations themselves. If the fi-
201. Transactions occurring prior to insolvency would not implicate the constructive
fraudulent transfer laws, but those occurring after insolvency would.
202. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 408; Posner, Affiliated Corpora-
tions, supra note 28, at 513-14.
203. Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28, at 513.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 168-169.
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nancial condition of the business is such that managers believe that the
group will not survive, managers' desire to avoid distortions in informa-
tion may be outweighed by the potential profitability of the
misappropriation.
A more fundamental problem with relying on the profit center con-
cept as a limitation on misappropriation risk arises from the conceptual
difficulties raised by transfer pricing.20 5 Transfer pricing for managerial
purposes may differ radically from the pricing structure in truly in-
dependent corporations. The term "profit center" suggests corporate en-
tities that, apart from the fact that they are affiliated in the ownership
sense, operate as independent autonomous entities. Such is not the case.
In fact, transfer pricing practices often diverge from market-based
pricing.20 6
Effective transfer pricing mechanisms fulfill several goals. Accord-
ing to commentators, there are three criteria in effective transfer pricing:
efficiency, monitoring, and fairness. 20 7 In order for a business to set its
price and output at the most efficient level,208 the input prices must be
valued correctly. This may require setting the transfer price at marginal
cost rather than market price, unless the input is sold in a perfectly com-
petitive market.20 9 Monitoring and managerial fairness must also be con-
sidered when determining the transfer price.210 Satisfying all of these
goals may require that transfer prices differ from the market prices.
Thus, corporations may only rarely be expected to price intragroup
transfers by reference to the market. While this is clearly justifiable from
a managerial perspective, the allocation of enterprise risk among the sub-
sidiaries is necessarily distorted. While operating as "profit centers" in a
managerial sense, individual subsidiaries may, from the creditors' per-
spective, have artificial revenues and costs.
205. See ROBERT G. ECCLES, THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM: A THEORY FOR PRAC-
TICE 1 (1985) ("The transfer pricing problem is a difficult and frustrating one. Although there
has been substantial interest in this problem among academics, many managers regard it as
unsolved or unsolvable.").
206. In a study of the transfer pricing practices of 13 companies, Robert Eccles discovered
that only 30% of these companies utilized a market price policy. Id. at 110. See also RALPH
L. BENKE, JR. & JAMES DON EDWARDS, TRANSFER PRICING: TECHNIQUES AND USES 43-47
(1980) (noting that market based pricing could result in a "profit buildup"-a condition result-
ing from transfers through several divisions-that could distort cost information).
207. Howard Shelanski, Robinson-Patman Act Regulation of Intraenterprise Pricing, 80
CAL. L. REV. 247, 262 (1992).
208. A firm maximizes profits at the level of output at which marginal cost is equal to
marginal revenue. See, e.g., ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND
PRODUCTION: COMPETITION COORDINATION AND CONTROL 208 (3d ed. 1983).
209. Jack Hirshleifer, On The Economics of Transfer Pricing, 29 J. Bus. 172, 172 (1956).
210. ECCLES, supra note 205, at 35-40.
Transfer pricing issues have presented an intractable problem under
the Internal Revenue Code. The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the
Internal Revenue Service to adjust the taxable income of commonly con-
trolled taxpayers in order to place these taxpayers on a tax parity with
the uncontrolled taxpayers that deal at arm's length. 2 1' These adjust-
ments often involve an inquiry into the pricing of intragroup transfers.
These transfer pricing cases have been described as "monsters"-involv-
ing extensive motions related to discovery and burden of proof issues,
and taking years to resolve. 212 Transfer pricing cases are so complex that
the Tax Court now imposes an arbitration procedure in transfer pricing
cases,213 and the House Ways and Means Committee is considering a
proposal to partially abandon the arm's length method of determining
the taxable income of U.S. and foreign corporations. 21 4
Complexity in transfer pricing makes it nearly impossible to deter-
mine the "fairness" of the intragroup exchange. Deciding that a transac-
tion or series of transactions was for less than "reasonably equivalent
value" or "fair consideration" would require the court to understand the
transfer pricing structure and to determine whether the transactions at
issue comported with the creditors' expectations when they determined
the level of enterprise risk their loans entailed. 21 5 In addition, the court
would have to value any cost efficiencies generated by the organizational
structure and derive some reasoned method of allocating cost savings.
These difficulties render fraudulent transfer laws ineffective as a creditor
protection against misappropriation risk arising from a vertically inte-
grated corporate relationship.
VI. A Model for Substantive Consolidation
Given the difficulties noted above, misappropriation risk may re-
main an impediment to the full internalization of enterprise risk in some
corporate groups. The baseline rule of limited liability within corporate
groups allows management to shift assets among members of the group,
and thereby to increase the risk of particular members after credit exten-
211. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1992).
212. Kenneth B. Clark, A Different Approach to Resolving Section 482 Disputes, TAX
NOTES INT'L, July 6, 1992, at 53.
213. Id.
214. See Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Bill of 1992, H.R. 5270,
§ 304, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
215. If the transfer pricing scheme is fixed, the effects of the organizational structure on
enterprise risk will be reflected in the financial statements of the various subsidiaries. Thus a
corporate group's employment of a non-market based transfer mechanism does not necessarily
imply that the business is able to externalize risk.
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sion. Thus, limited liability is an important factor in the increase of mis-
appropriation risk.
This analysis does not suggest, however, the automatic substantive
consolidation of all corporate groups. While the elimination of limited
liability may substantially reduce the misappropriation risk faced by
small creditors, this remedy may be a bit heavy-handed. Abrogating lim-
ited liability carries increased transaction costs of its own. One of the
primary benefits of limited liability is that it enables businesses to segre-
gate assets for long-term financing. By assuring that assets will not be
subject to the claims of the creditors of other parts of the corporate
group, potential lenders to one business operation may analyze the
creditworthiness of that operation without regard to the remaining busi-
ness operations. If corporate groups are consolidated on a regular basis,
potential lenders will be forced to evaluate the credit of a broader group
of businesses.216 At worst, such a situation will cause multi-product
businesses to pay an interest rate that is based on the lowest common
denominator in terms of creditworthiness. At best, regular consolidation
will result in more creditors securing their loans to isolate their claims
against the income streams generated by particular asset bundles.
At a minimum, the legal regime under which creditors and share-
holders bargain over risk allocation and protection against misappropria-
tion risk should be as determinate as possible. This goal, in turn, requires
commitment to some indicia of the classes of cases to which a particular
rule, such as limited liability, should apply. Recognizing that a cost of
determinacy is that any particular rule will be under- or over-inclusive in
some instances, an analysis of organizational form, coupled with the
model of risk analysis set forth above, suggests an approach to the prob-
lem of limited liability that focuses on the organizational relationship be-
tween the members of the corporate group. Vertically integrated
organizations should routinely be consolidated in bankruptcy, while hor-
izontally related and conglomerate organizations should be consolidated
only in rare circumstances.
A. Consolidation of Vertically Integrated Organizations
The benefits of limited liability are attenuated in the context of verti-
cally integrated corporate groups. If the goal of vertical integration is to
reduce transaction costs associated with contracting across markets,
there are few benefits associated with integrating equity ownership while
keeping the contingent ownership associated with creditors' claims sepa-
216. Posner, Affiliated Corporations, supra note 28, at 517.
rate. Any savings in transaction costs achieved by unifying control over
assets would be lost if the corporations were to act as unrelated market
participants from the creditors' perspectives.
In fact, vertically integrated but separately incorporated members of
corporate groups do not act as unrelated entities from their creditors'
perspective. Profits from the production process must be allocated
among the various entities comprising the group. Because such profits
are allocated through managerial direction rather than through market
transactions, the level of misappropriation risk is increased. Because
contractual, reputational, and governance constraints are insufficient to
control misappropriation risk, creditors may be forced to rely on legal
constraints. But these legal protections are less effective when a verti-
cally integrated production process is split into separate subsidiaries be-
cause it is difficult to determine whether intercompany transfers between
members of the group have been priced fairly. Inasmuch as fraudulent
transfer proceedings fail to detect misappropriations in this context, there
are compelling reasons for the consolidation of these groups.
Further, a baseline rule of unlimited liability between vertically inte-
grated components of a single production process will likely comport
with most creditors and shareholders' desires regarding the allocation of
enterprise risk in such contexts. Production is integrated because asset
specificity problems increase the costs of contracting across markets.
The risks of incomplete contracting affect creditors as well as sharehold-
ers. Therefore, consolidating vertically integrated subsidiaries should not
be expected to result in increased transaction costs overall.
B. Consolidation in Horizontally Related and Conglomerate Organizations
Horizontally related and conglomerate organizations may benefit
more from a baseline rule of limited liability than do vertically integrated
organizations. Limiting liability by segregating operations in separate
subsidiaries may create managerial efficiencies by allowing the corporate
group to be operated as a miniature capital market. Thus, a baseline rule
of limited liability in this context is more likely to provide an allocation
of enterprise risk that is consistent with the parties' desires.
The legal controls on misappropriation risk are also more likely to
be effective in these organizations. Regardless of the economic relation-
ships between members of a corporate group, managers may have an in-
centive to engage in misappropriations by shifting assets among the
group's members. In horizontally related and conglomerate groups,
however, business separations between subsidiaries increase the likeli-
hood that any such asset shift will take the form of a dividend or in-
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tercompany loan rather than of a transfer pricing scheme. Fraudulent
transfer laws provide a much more realistic level of protection to credi-
tors when managers shift assets through cash transfers rather than
through transfers of goods and services.
C. Caveats and Limitations
It cannot be overemphasized that the model for substantive consoli-
dation presented in this Article provides only an off-the-rack rule that is
intended to reduce transaction costs by reducing the necessity of revising
the baseline risk allocation. Regardless of the rule chosen, there will con-
tinue to be situations in which the results provided by the rule are con-
trary to the contracting parties' desires. Thus, the model should apply
only in the absence of ex ante or ex post contractual risk allocations and
control devices.
First, consider ex ante contractual risk allocations. In some in-
stances, the enterprise risk of a particular component of a production
process may be so substantial that, without the benefits of limited liabil-
ity, that component would not be integrated. In these situations, unlim-
ited liability may result in less integration even when integration provides
the ownership structure that minimizes transaction costs. If manage-
ment can convince creditors that adequate non-legal controls against
misappropriation risk exist, the creditors may be induced to contractu-
ally limit their claims to the assets of the risky entity. In this manner,
enterprise risk could be allocated in a way that would make integration
attractive. The model for substantive consolidation simply requires that
the parties confront these issues in their contract negotiations. It does
not provide results that cannot be altered through contract. 21 7
A second and perhaps more subtle point is that the parties must
retain the ability to alter the legal regime ex post through the negotiation
structure provided by Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In deciding
to consolidate affiliated corporations, a few courts have noted that the
consolidation was necessary to the development of a plan of reorganiza-
tion.218 Consolidation may be beneficial in reorganizations because it
eliminates concerns over the priority of intercompany claims, problems
stemming from fraudulent transfer, and claims of creditors against two
or more members of the group. Consolidation may also reduce litigation
over which entity owns particular assets and may substantially simplify
217. The same is true for the reallocation of risk through guaranties and security interests.
218. See, e.g., In re Murray Indus., 119 B.R. 820, 832 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 147
B.R. 597 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); In re F.A. Potts & Co. 23 B.R. 569, 574 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982).
the classification and treatment of creditors. In these bankruptcy situa-
tions, some mechanism must exist to consolidate even horizontally re-
lated and conglomerate entities in order to preserve the possibility of an
effective reorganization.
The mechanism should not, however, be a judicial determination
that consolidation is in the interest of all of the creditor groups. Chapter
11 of the Code is premised on negotiations leading to a consensual plan
of reorganization under which consolidation could be a feature. Credi-
tors are permitted to express their individual approval of a plan rather
than rely on a judicial finding that a particular outcome is in their inter-
est. Chapter 11 's negotiation and voting process avoids the representa-
tional problems that may be expected in a judicial process. 219 The
outcomes provided by the substantive consolidation model, like the ef-
fects of the general system of priority, should not be permitted to inter-
fere with the Code's structure for ex post negotiations.
D. Problematic Fact Patterns
A model of substantive consolidation that focuses on the vertical or
horizontal relatedness of separate subsidiaries may not provide courts
with an absolutely clear indicator of the need for consolidation in all
cases. The existence of misappropriation risk renders any neat system of
corporate law, including substantive consolidation, subject to exceptions
in extreme circumstances.
In many bankruptcy cases, the parties will face managerial actions
that do not fit neatly within the confines of the model presented here.
Managers will continue to transfer assets among entities without ade-
quate record keeping and will misrepresent the corporate structure of the
business. 220 In these situations, substantive consolidation may be re-
quired even in the bankruptcies of horizontally related and conglomerate
organizations.
Another possible problem is that many organizational forms may
not fit neatly within the confines of a vertical-horizontal dichotomy.
Some members of a corporate group may operate as cost centers, supply-
ing a needed product or service to several horizontally related affiliates.
In re Murray Industries221 presented an example of this type of problem.
In Murray, several horizontally related manufacturing entities shared
common names and two of the subsidiaries provided transportation and
219. See Frost, supra note 151, at 94-97.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
221. 119 B.R. 820 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
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research and development services to the other entities. 222 The cost
center subsidiaries and parent corporation could have been viewed as
vertically integrated with several subsidiaries. The court's response,
however, was to consolidate the entire corporate group, rather than deal
with the more difficult question of the economic organization of the
business.223
The problems such a situation creates are solvable within the con-
fines of the model presented here. If the corporations are to be liqui-
dated, some of the assets and liabilities could be allocated among the
various entities by analyzing the relative use of the services or assets of
the subsidiaries.224 If creditors and shareholders agree on a reorganiza-
tion of the entities, the plan negotiations could resolve these issues.225
Conclusion
Bankruptcy is perhaps the best arena in which to examine the im-
pact and effectiveness of the corporate law structure. In the midst of a
complete business or financial collapse, the effect of contracts allocating
the risk of that very event can be seen with clarity. Much of the conflict
in bankruptcy revolves around the priority of distribution and control
over the liquidation or reorganization. Yet the failure of a corporate
group casts a spotlight on the equally important issue of allocating assets
and liabilities among the various entities comprising the group.
Corporate shareholders and creditors allocate risk against the back-
drop of existing laws and their contracts reflect expectations created by
these general rules. If the parties are satisfied with the risk allocation
corporate law provides, their contracts can be expected to be silent on
this subject. It is only when parties are dissatisfied with the risk alloca-
tion resulting from the general rule that their contracts will address the
problem. Of course, this assumes that the existing rules are reasonably
predictable.
Some courts facing consolidation questions have failed to provide a
principled basis for the application of the doctrine. Tests that seek to
balance the benefits and burdens of a consolidation order and analyses
that are based on creditor reliance do no more than legitimize a post hoc
222. Id. at 824.
223. Id. at 832.
224. It might be possible to provide the cost center subsidiary with a pro-rata claim
against each of the other subsidiaries it serves. The claims would, in the aggregate, equal the
amount by which the cost center's liabilities exceed its assets, and the total amount would be
pro-rated based on some guideline such as level of usage.
225. See supra text accompanying note 219.
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reshuffling of expectations. The problem of determining creditor expec-
tations is exacerbated by the fact that each attempt renders the baseline
rules uncertain. What is left is a mess that can only be sorted out by
clarifying the baseline rules themselves.
Any desire for a clear baseline rule must be balanced against the fact
that diverse corporate organizations create differing risk relationships
among capital contributors. Some corporate structures rely to a greater
extent on the limitation of liability than do others. Moreover, limiting
liability in some organizations presents a greater risk that shareholders
will successfully misappropriate corporate wealth. Thus, one baseline
rule regarding the scope of liability may not be the most effective in all
circumstances.
An approach to substantive consolidation that focuses on the level
of vertical integration between the various entities comprising the corpo-
rate group strikes a middle ground between a regime of pristine clarity
and a system of ad hoc rules individually tailored to specific corporate
relationships. Vertically integrated firms are more likely to create the
highest level of uncontrolled misappropriation risk because it is difficult
to apply fraudulent transfer laws to the transfers taking place between
such entities. Not only would consolidation eliminate a significant
source of this type of risk, but it is also the baseline rule that normally
comports with parties' risk allocation preferences.
There is less of a risk that shareholder misappropriations in horizon-
tally related and conglomerate firms will remain unremedied. Because of
the business separations between the members of these types of organiza-
tions, fraudulent transfer laws provide more realistic creditor protection
against the risk that asset shifting will increase the enterprise risk in a
particular entity. In addition, these forms of productive organization are
more likely to require a limitation of liability between constituents in or-
der to fully realize the efficiencies they generate. Only by both focusing
on the economic reasons for separate incorporation and providing base-
lines that correspond to the parties' preferred risk allocations and needed
protections, can courts provide a workable corporate limited liability
framework.
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